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“Où est la Masse de Manoeuvre?”: Maurice Gamelin and the Lessons 
of Blitzkrieg in Poland 
Robert Parker 
The spectacular defeat of the French army in May-June 1940 has invited a long tradition 
of criticism aimed at France’s Commander-in-Chief, Maurice Gamelin.  In particular, Gamelin’s 
strategy has been criticised for failing to provide a strong strategic reserve behind the French 
continuous front.  This thesis will endeavor to explain why the armies of France were left with 
no strategic reserve to counter the German breakthrough along the Meuse river on May 12
th
, 
1940.   How could the French high command fail to provide the country with such a fundamental 
safeguard?  
It will be argued that Gamelin’s strategy was deeply affected by the Polish campaign of 
September 1939.  This brief struggle had convinced him that the traditional use of strategic 
reserves had proven ineffective in a modern war.  This conviction, coupled with erroneous 
intelligence grossly exaggerating the extent of the German military buildup, caused Gamelin to 
gamble recklessly with the deployment of his armies.  His choice was to fortify France’s 
continuous front with the bulk of the country’s reserve forces in an attempt to receive the invader 
with the maximum concentration at the point of contact.  This would leave the country 
defenceless in the event of a breakthrough anywhere along its extended front. Gamelin’s gamble 
was thus an “all or nothing” proposition.  When the German army indeed broke through the 
iv 
 
center of his line, France’s generalissimo had no answer and in admitting the failure of his risky 
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The speed and finality with which France’s army collapsed in May-June 1940 bewildered 
military and civilian onlookers alike, leaving them in search of explanations among the ruins of 
the Third Republic.  Marc Bloch, one of the first and most astute chroniclers of the brief struggle 
summed up the sentiment of millions: 
 
We find ourselves today in this appalling situation – that the fate of France no 
longer depends upon the French.  Since that moment when the weapons which 
we held with too indeterminate a grasp fell from our hands, the future of our 
country and of our civilization has become the stake in a struggle of which we, 
for the most part, are only the rather humiliated spectators.”1 
 
 
Such humiliation cried out for an explanation – some reason to make sense of total and 
unexpected defeat.  From the start, France’s high command was targeted for its part in the 
debacle.  In particular, French strategists were indicted for their reluctance to evolve from the 
military framework of 1918 to the faster pace of warfare as it was practiced in 1940.  Strange 
Defeat, Bloch’s classic account written between July and September 1940, was among the 
earliest to accuse the French high command of incompetence.  He observed: “What drove our 
armies to disaster was the cumulative effect of a great number of different mistakes.  One glaring 
characteristic is, however, common to all of them.  Our leaders...were incapable of thinking in 
terms of a new war.”2  In 1944, Pertinax (Journalist André Géraud) wrote a scathing critique of 
French political and military leaders.  In The Gravediggers of France he concludes: “even more 
                                                 
1
 Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: a Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New York: Oxford U.P., 1949), 
174. 
2
 Ibid. 36. 
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than the politicians, the Generals will have to answer the nation’s misfortune.”3  Similarly, in his 
post-war memoirs, Charles de Gaulle describes a conversation he had with Prime Minister Léon 
Blum during October 1936, in which Blum expressed his belief that France’s continuous front 
was secure.  De Gaulle corrected the Prime Minister by reminding him that by 1918, faith in the 
concept of an inviolable front had already been abandoned and that advances in the designs of 
tanks and aircraft had only reinforced this point.  De Gaulle claims Blum had been misled by the 
military establishment which failed to appreciate the impact of technological advancement 
during the interwar years.
4
   
 
As Commander-in-Chief of National Defence, Maurice Gustave Gamelin stood squarely 
in the crosshairs of such accusations.  A brilliant and accomplished general in his youth, Gamelin 
nevertheless failed dismally in his effort to defend France from the re-energized German military 
threat which had been steadily growing since Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933.  Following the 
defeat of 1940, Gamelin was arrested and detained at the Schloss Itter, constrained and 
humiliated by the same enemy he had once expected to defeat.  In his way, Gamelin personified 
the French nation’s downward trajectory from major Continental victor of the First World War, 
to defeated satellite of the Third Reich.  Like that of the French army, Gamelin’s reputation was 
so completely shattered by the events of May-June 1940 that it became difficult to reconcile 
most accounts of his pre-war persona with its post-war counterpart. 
Historians too have wrestled with two mutually exclusive conceptual frameworks 
surrounding Maurice Gamelin.  The first is of a brilliant career officer, feared and respected by 
                                                 
3
 Pertinax, The Gravediggers of France (New York: Doubleday, 1944), 84. 
4
 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre I: L’Appel 1940-1942 (Paris: Plon, 1954) 19-20. 
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friend and foe alike. The British referred to him as “notre Gamelin”5 while German General 
Beck hung a portrait of Gamelin in his study.
6
  This version of Gamelin saw him fast tracked 
through the ranks of the army, attaining the position of general by the age of forty-four.  As 
Commander-in-Chief of the Levant, he suppressed insurrection from 1925 to 1928 where he 
“revealed himself as a master of improvisation and adaptability.”7  During the crisis of 1914, he 
wrote the order leading to the decisive Battle of the Marne.  He was the able and decisive 
commander of the 11
th
 infantry division as of 1917, a unit which performed with distinction 
during the German Spring Offensive in 1918.  This is the general pictured on the front page of 
Time Magazine in August 1939 referred to as “the world’s foremost soldier”.8 
 
In opposition to this, another version of Gamelin has evolved after decades of 
investigation into the causes of France’s sudden defeat.  This version is of a slippery, eloquent 
bureaucrat-soldier.  Prime Minister Daladier compared a conversation with Gamelin to sand 
falling through one`s fingers.
9
  This Gamelin charged headlong into the Belgian trap outlined in 
Germany’s Manstein Plan, and then refused to admit his mistake until it was too late to rescue 
France`s northern armies and the British Expeditionary Force from encirclement.  This Gamelin 
appeared distant and ineffective throughout the nine days in which he led the French army 
subsequent to May 10
th, 1940.  It was an image supported by a number of Gamelin’s own 
subordinates, even prior to the war and its immediate setbacks.  Among them was his 
                                                 
5
 Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe: The Dilemmas of French Impotence, 1918-1940. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 1992), 54. 
6
 Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000),128. 
7
 Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger: Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Rearmament 
(New York: Oxford U.P., 1992), 23. 
8
 No Author, “Good Grey Soldier,” Time, August 14, 1939 (34:7), 22 
9
 Julian Jackson. The Fall of France (Oxford: Oxford U.P. 2003), 12. 
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Commander of the Northeast Front, General Alphonse Georges, who claimed: “He’s nothing but 
a poor theoretician.  When he visits the army, he gives monologues, never inquiring about the 
soldiers’ needs.  He evades questions instead of welcoming them.  It isn’t surprising then, that he 
fails to inspire any confidence among his subordinates.”10   
 
The two versions of Gamelin are so at odds with one another that it becomes difficult to 
consider them both in reference to one and the same man.  Historians writing after the military 
disaster have largely favored the second version of Gamelin, gradually uncovering a long list of 
personal and professional shortcomings which, in one way or another, contributed to France’s ill-
prepared defense in the spring of 1940.  “Whatever the deep-seated causes of the disaster may 
have been, the immediate occasion…was the utter incompetence of the High Command”,11 wrote 
Bloch.  Pertinax’s attack was more personal; he levelled his gaze at specific personalities, 
dismissing the Commander-in-Chief’s character as one singularly unfit for leadership.  
According to Pertinax, Gamelin burdened himself with what he thought were the “lessons [of the 
First World War].  All his learning sank into a set of fixed certainties which he was loathe to 
check against changing realities...he failed to notice that the experimental data upon which his 
arguments rested had gradually become obsolete.”12  Charles de Gaulle picked up on this same 
thread in the first volume of his memoirs. There, de Gaulle narrates a memorable encounter with 
Gamelin in April 1940.  This passage famously described the generalissimo’s HQ at Vincennes 
as akin to a monastery, and Gamelin himself to a scientist in his laboratory.  The image of a 
                                                 
10
 Paul de Villelume, Journal d’une Défaite 23 août 1939 – 16 juin 1940 (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 267. (All 
translations from the French in this text are the work of this author, unless otherwise stated). 
11
 Bloch, Étrange Défaite, 25. 
12
 Pertinax, 34. 
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detached, aloof, unreachable Commander-in-Chief has become commonplace in the 
historiography of Maurice Gamelin’s role in the failed defence of France, but de Gaulle 
comments upon it rather more eloquently than most.  “He had convinced himself that at his level 
of command, the essential thing was to concentrate his willpower once and for all on a definite 
plan of action, and refuse to be dissuaded in this by any distraction whatsoever.”13   Later de 
Gaulle adds, “in hearing him, I was convinced that by pouring all of his efforts into one 
particular military system, and refining it tirelessly, he had made it into a kind of religion.”14  
Historians have revisited this perception of Gamelin time and again over the intervening 
decades.  Alistair Horne described Gamelin’s leadership style as operating “in a kind of 
intellectual vacuum.”15  Karl-Heinz Frieser echoed de Gaulle in concluding that Gamelin 
“consistently disregarded the operational realities and accepted only information he liked.”16  
William Shirer observed, “the lethargy, the hesitancy of the Commander-in-Chief leaves one 
breathless.”17  Nicole Jordan suggested Gamelin entered the war “totally bankrupt of a military 
strategy, he bided always for more time to launch a mythical future offensive.”18 
What emerges from such studies, indeed from most studies on the subject of Gamelin, is 
the image of an incompetent leader, or in the words of R.J. Young, “an elderly general, no longer 
a decisive man…a philosopher general with a preference for negotiation over resistance…a 
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Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs : The Call to Honor 1940-42. (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1955), 
293. 
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 Ibid. 294. 
15
 Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle (Glasgow: MacMillan, 1969) 102. 
16
 Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 144. 
17
 William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1969) 701. 
18
 Nicole Jordan, “Strategy and Scapegoatism: Reflections on the French National Catastrophe, 1940,” In 
The French Defeat of 1940, Reassessments, ed. Joel Blatt.(Oxford: Berghahn, 1998), 22. 
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desire to bargain, to stall.”19  Historians have traced the roots of French defeat to a variety of 
short-sighted mistakes on Gamelin’s part.  These include his lack of flexibility, his inadequate 
strategic planning, and his failure to learn the lessons from Hitler’s conquest in Poland. In the 
1960s, Alistair Horne popularized the notion that the French High Command paid the price for 
“its apparent refusal to take cognizance of the lessons of the Polish Campaign.”20 Nicole Jordan 
has blamed the defeat on Gamelin’s lack of strategic planning and on desperate attempts to keep 
the bulk of the fighting away from France, thereby avoiding the kind of bloodletting seen in 
1914-18.  As a result of this fixation, no plan was formed to deal with the possibility of a 
German breakthrough of the forward-set continuous front.
21
  Karl Heinz Frieser has argued that 
Gamelin should have been able to identify the German feint into the Low Countries as the 
diversion it really was.  But because Gamelin “disregarded the operational realities and accepted 
only information he liked” French army groups were unable to pull back toward the French 
border soon enough to save themselves from encirclement.
22
   
 
Of chief concern to this work is the criticism of Gamelin for failing to maintain a 
strategic reserve of sufficient size to counter the German breakthrough on the Meuse.  “This 
omission”, Shirer writes, “was later to baffle the experts on both sides.”23  How could such an 
accomplished military leader fail to provide such a basic safeguard to protect his army against 
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 R.J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning 1933-1940 
(Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1978) 120. 
20
 Horne, 113. 
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 Jordan, “Strategy and Scapegoatism”, 18-19. 
22
 Frieser, 144. 
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 Shirer, 589. 
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unforeseeable setbacks?  Gamelin is often accused of conducting war along the model of 1914-
18 but even this outdated model would have put a priority on establishing a strong reserve behind 
the front lines. Historian François Delpla has observed: 
 
Gamelin wasn’t fighting the previous war, he wasn’t even prepared to do that.  
To wait for an attack from the enemy without knowing where the main effort 
will take place and to not have reserves ready to move as soon as this 
information was discerned, or at least to not even consider this a priority, that is 





The intent of this paper is to present new insight into Gamelin’s decision to leave France 
bereft of the kind of significant strategic reserves which saved the country in August-September 
1914.  Why were these reserve units incorporated into the front lines and thrown into Belgium 
where they were quickly outflanked and neutralised by the German army?  It will be shown that 
this was done as part of a radical shift in strategy adopted by Gamelin following his study of the 
short war in Poland.  Far from an oversight, the disappearance of France’s strategic reserve was a 
deliberate attempt to change the French “procedures of combat” in response to the new mobile 
tactics put on display by German armor and aviation on the open fields of Poland.
25
  It will also 
be shown that by committing his forces to an aggressive forward defense in Belgium, Gamelin 
embarked on a fully conscious, high stakes gamble to blunt the initial contact with the Blitzkrieg.  
This extreme risk was deemed necessary after years of inflated estimates of German strength had 
convinced Gamelin that he was facing odds of at least 2:1 on both land and air along his 
                                                 
24
 François Delpla. Les Papiers Secrets du General Doumenc: Un Autre Regard sur 39-40.  (Paris: Olivier 
Orban, 1992) 155n1. 
25
 Doughty quotes Gamelin from April 1937 as saying, “while doctrine does not change, procedures of 
combat do”, and added that procedures could be modified during a campaign.  Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of 
Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939. (Hamdon, CT: Archon Books, 1985), 8. 
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northeast front.  Finally, this argument will attempt to clarify the enduring questions which 
persist about Gamelin’s seemingly inexplicable retreat from active command following the 
German breakthrough.   It will be shown that even before May 10
th
, Gamelin envisioned his 
forward defense as an “all or nothing” proposition.  When it became evident that he had guessed 
incorrectly, that the focal point of the German attack was further south in the center of his line 
opposite the Ardennes, Gamelin remained consistent to his strategic conception and treated the 
battle as though it were already lost, requiring only a little time to be played out to its necessary 
conclusion.   
 
1- Inferiority Complex 
 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, France’s high command habitually 
over-estimated the strength of the renascent German military machine, while at the same time 
reporting negatively on its own ability to wage war successfully.  At times, alarmist reporting on 
the speed with which the German army grew in size took on a life of its own.
26
  On October 23
rd
 
1939, the French Intelligence agency, the Deuxième Bureau, estimated 70 German divisions on 
the western front.  The next day, this was inexplicably increased by twenty to a total of 90 
divisions.  Five days later, on the 29
th
, reports circulated reinforcing the picture of 90 German 
                                                 
26
 The habit of exaggerating German military potential started after 1918 as intelligence agencies included 
various paramilitary groups in the overall numbers of German soldiers.  France was always suspicious of such 
clandestine groups whereby Germany could circumnavigate the restrictions imposed by the Versailles treaty. As a 
result, by the 1920s, French strategy was already based on wildly inflated imaginings of German strength.  See Peter 
Jackson, “French Intelligence and Hitler’s Rise to Power.” The Historical Journal. 41:3 (1998): 800.  
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divisions, this time supported by 76 more in the rear.
27
  By January 1940, Maurice Gamelin 
informed his government that the Germans had 135 divisions at the ready, soon to become 200.  
By mid-April, Gamelin increased this figure to 205.
28
  On September 1
st
 1939, Lt. Col. Maurice-
Henri Gauché, head of the Deuxième Bureau, estimated German strength at 150 divisions and 
predicted this was only half of Germany’s potential.  Gauché concluded that the Germans were 




Recent studies place the actual number of German divisions on the eve of the attack at 
157, of which only 93 took part in the attack on Western Europe.
30
  Clearly then, French 
assumptions of German infantry presented the image of an overwhelmingly powerful neighbour 
with the potential to crush France’s army (104 divisions manning the country’s northeastern 
front) through sheer weight of numbers.   
Infantry divisions were not the only exaggerated component of German military 
potential.  Estimates of German armor, officially released by the Deuxième Bureau were 
similarly inflated.  While French intelligence correctly assessed the number of Panzerdivisionen 
at ten since early 1940, they believed additional German tanks were also spread out in battalion 
strength throughout the army, as was the case in France.  As a result, the Deuxième Bureau 
                                                 
27
de Villelume, 77-80. 
28
 May, Strange Victory, 352. 
29
 Maurice Henri Gauché, Le Deuxième Bureau au Travail (Paris: Amiot, 1952), 162-3.  
30
 Frieser, 36. 
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reported to Gamelin in April that total German armored strength was estimated somewhere 
between 7000 and 10000 tanks
31
 to contest France’s 3200.32   
It has been suggested that such figures were used before September 1939 as intentional 
exaggerations created to discourage France’s government from engaging in any diplomatic sabre 
rattling that might lead prematurely to war.
33
  Their continued use and embellishment following 
France’s declaration of war on Germany were rationalised by Gamelin himself as “smoke-
screens in case things turn out badly”34.  Furthermore, in his own memoirs, Gamelin admits that 
he allowed the Deuxième Bureau to publish reports of 12 to 14 Panzerdivisionen, of no less than 
500 tanks each, in order to “shake up public opinion.”35   
Whatever political reasons there were to hyperbolise the German threat, it must be noted 
that Gamelin sincerely believed Nazi rearmament programs had vastly outpaced France’s own 
efforts by the eve of the German attack on Western Europe.  On May 18
th
, the penultimate day of 
Gamelin’s military career, he believed the German invasion had included between 3000-4000 
heavy tanks.  In fact, only 278 Panzer IVs had actually taken part in the battle.
36
  Even after 
war’s end, Gamelin’s estimate of total German Panzer strength during the battle was still grossly 
                                                 
31
 Gauché, 189-90.     
32
 Frieser, 37 
33
 May, 353;  Adolphe Goutard, The Battle of France (London: Frederick Muller, 1958), 25-26.  
34
 Gamelin, Servir I, 272. 
35
 Ibid. Norman Ingram has revealed an important reason why Gamelin felt the need to shake up public 
opinion. The prevailing pacifist sentiment of the 1930s caused concerns that large numbers of Frenchmen would 
simply refuse to fight when the time came.  Ingram observes that “some estimates placed at 300 000 the number of 
men who, influenced by pacifism, are liable to return their mobilization papers or destroy them in the event of a 
direct threat of armed conflict.” Norman Ingram. “The Circulaire Chautemps, 1933: The Third Republic Discovers 
Conscientious Objection.” French Historical Studies, 17:2 (1991): 404. 
36
 Jacques Minart, P.C. Vincennes: Secteur 4. Vol II (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1945), 172-73. 
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inaccurate, numbering somewhere between 4000 and 5000 tanks.
37
  He was not alone in 
maintaining the image of a German tidal wave crashing through the Ardennes.  His successor as 
Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, Maxime Weygand, maintained his opinion that 7500 
German tanks had taken part in the Battle of France as late as 1961.
38
  Since the actual number 
hovered somewhere near 2100 (with an additional 330 Czech tanks seized in 1939),
39
 there can 
be little doubt that in the months leading up to the invasion, France’s high command had 
mistakenly convinced itself that the country faced crushing German numerical superiority in both 
manpower and armor.
40




Joseph Vuillemin, commander of the French air force, prognosticated a similarly gloomy 
future for his pilots and machines in the event of war with Germany.  At a meeting of the Comité 
Permanent de la Défense Nationale (March 15
th
, 1938), he predicted that in case of war with 
Germany, France’s air force would be decimated (anéantie) within fifteen days.42  At the same 
                                                 
37
Gamelin, Servir I, 160.  In this overestimation, Gamelin was hardly alone.  At his hearing during the 
Vichy government’s Riom Trial, which labored to ascribe guilt for France’s defeat on the military/civilian 
leadership of the Third Republic, General Georges estimated that between 7000-8000 German tanks had invaded 
France.  He added that in his opinion, one German Panzer was worth 30 French armored divisions.  Henri Michel, 
Le Procès de Riom (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1970), p.288. 
38
 Maxime Weygand, L’Histoire de l’Armée Française.  (Paris : Amiot, 1961), 397. 
39
 Frieser, 37. 
40
 In his study of French intelligence gathering during the 1930s, Peter Jackson has shown that in an effort 
to combat the policies of disarmament and financial austerity, intelligence gatherers provided the civilian 
government with inflated estimates of German military power.  Peter Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace 
(Oxford: Oxford U.P. 2000), 109-110.  This explanation does not clarify why Gamelin and Weygand would have 
both received and accepted these numbers as well.  Clearly, the image of a Nazi juggernaut had already crystalized 
in the perceptions of civilian and military leaders alike, independently of any politically-motivated “smokescreens” 
set up by the Deuxième Bureau.  
41
In his excellent study of the battle, Colonel Karl-Heinz Frieser has recently documented the number of 
infantry divisions which participated in the battle from May 10
th
 to June 21
st
 1940 as 93 German versus 104 French.  
In terms of armor, the French also enjoyed an overall numerical superiority of 3254 versus a German total of 2439.  
Frieser, 36-37. 
42
 Gamelin, Servir II, 326. 
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meeting, air minister Guy de la Chambre claimed that French production of aircraft stood at forty 
(soon to be sixty) per month.  Marshal Pétain, also present at the meeting, voiced his concern 
over this shortcoming in light of the German production which he estimated at two hundred and 
fifty planes per month.
43
   
On April 1
st
, 1940 Vuillemin presented Gamelin with the assumption that the Luftwaffe 
had already achieved a quantitative superiority which France alone could never hope to contest.  
His report counted 5700 first line planes with 8500 in reserve for a total of over 14000 planes.
44
  
This was to be pitted against France’s 3100 planes stationed at home both in rear areas and at the 
northeast front in May 1940.  In truth, the actual number of German fighters and bombers was 
around 3400 with another 2000 reconnaissance/transport planes in support.
45
  What made 
Vuillemin’s estimate so unnecessarily dispiriting was that it tended to sap whatever optimism 
could have resulted from the almost miraculous achievements made by the French air industry 
since 1938.
46
 While it had mobilised slowly, French aircraft production had gained such 
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 Gamelin, Servir II, 326. 
44
 May, 354. 
45
 Ibid.  
46
 After witnessing steady increase in aircraft production during 1935-6, French industry was unable to 
sustain the effort and declined somewhat in 1937 and 1938.  By the following year, however, a truly remarkable 
increase in production brought the total construction of fighters from 134 in 1938 to 948 in only the first eight 
months of 1939.  Following this incredible success, the final four months of the year saw the construction of another 
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Germany’s sometimes acute financial and economic constraints.  As a result, French estimates relied on projecting 
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economic realities.  See Peter Jackson, “French Intelligence and Hitler’s Rise to Power.” The Historical Journal. 
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The vast amount of misinformation regarding the extent of German military buildup, 
coupled with a tendency to exaggerate the shortcomings of France’s own industrial/military 
potential, had a powerfully sobering effect on the French high command.
48
  While there was no 
reason to doubt the fighting quality of the individual French soldier, it was not yet clear whether 
those soldiers would be able to meet their German counterparts in battle in sufficient numbers 
and with the necessary equipment to carry the day.
49
  By August, even though Gamelin was able 
to tell his government that “the French army is ready for war”50, he had no sure means of 
knowing just how hard and in what form the expected hammer blow from the east would fall. 
To make matters worse, September brought ominous news from the east.  Reports began 
to arrive from the intelligence gathering mission sent to observe and advise the Polish army 
struggling to defend itself against the weight of the Wehrmacht.  Three main sources advised 
                                                 
47
 Even the normally gloomy Paul de Vuillemin grew in confidence in the final months of the Phoney War 
stating that in terms of numbers of fighters, France would draw even with Germany in 6 months’ time.  This reversal 
of the usual image of Luftwaffe pre-eminence over the skies of Western Europe has been explored in the works of 
Peter Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace, p. 381;  Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger: Maurice Gamelin 
and the Politics of French Rearmament (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 1993), p. 322 and Karl-Heinz Frieser, The 
Blitzkrieg Legend, pp. 45-46.   
48
 In France, manpower and industrial shortages vis-à-vis Germany were well known.  Peter Jackson argues 
that after Munich, the country was in a state of shock “by the realisation that France had come to the very brink of a 
war for which she was in no way prepared.”  Peter Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace,  306.  In this atmosphere, 
intelligence on the progress of German rearmament only deepened the sense of inferiority and pessimism which 
already permeated French civilian and military leadership. 
49
 Gamelin’s 1940 War Plan was developed on the demoralizing assumption that Allied forces would suffer 
from a 2.3 to 1 inferiority.  Jeffery Gunsberg. Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat 
of the West, 1940 (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 139. 
50
 This statement was made at a meeting of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre on August 23, 1939.  
Gamelin emphatically denied that he ever made such a claim, despite the existing transcript.  According to him, 




Gamelin and the other French Chiefs of Staff on the nature of modern war as it was being 
practiced on the wide open Polish plains.  Generals Felix Musse, Louis Faury and Jules 
Armengaud reported a new type of warfare, one of rapid armored movement and close co-
ordination between air and ground forces.  These reports explained the impact of massed armor 
hitting in waves upon a narrow front, creating a breach through which poured motorised infantry, 
all the while supported by the Luftwaffe’s low flying bombers and fighter aircraft.51    
Reports from the French mission to Poland were supplemented by the first-hand accounts 
of refugee Polish officers.  These sources provided a wealth of information on German tactics.  
The accounts were gathered and synthesised by the Deuxième Bureau, into a publication entitled 
Remarques Sur la Tactique Allemande Utilisée en Pologne
52
.  This compilation illustrated the 
German practice of choosing a narrow area within an opponent’s line of defence in which to 
conduct breakthrough operations using large armored units.  Once through the enemy’s defences, 
their practice, as reported by Armengaud, was to outstrip the retreating enemy and block their 
retreat using highly mobile mechanized units.  Any withdrawal thus became a trap from which 
Polish soldiers were unable to extricate themselves.  Polish mobility was handicapped by the 
effects of these fast moving panzers, and even more so by the Luftwaffe’s seemingly ubiquitous 
intervention. 
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In 1969 Alistair Horne wrote, “Of all the attitudes struck by the French High Command 
during the Phoney War, none today seems more incomprehensible than its apparent refusal to 
take cognizance of the lessons of the Polish campaign.”53 This paper argues, on the contrary, 
that, far from being blind to the lessons of Poland, Gamelin was, in fact, guilty of over-reacting 
to the events of September 1939. As will be shown, it is possible to draw a clear line of 
distinction between Gamelin’s strategy for the defence of France as it stood before September 
1939, and how it was altered after this period due to his intelligence on German actions in 
Poland.  To this end, a detailed look at the most important lessons Gamelin took away from the 
events in Poland becomes essential.   
 
 
Lesson One: The Importance of Early Concentration 
Armengaud sent his report from neutral Romania on September 23
rd
, deeply impressed 
by the speed with which the German army had overrun western Poland.  According to him, one 
of Poland’s most important mistakes occurred before the fighting even started.  That is, Polish 
leaders declined to begin mobilization before the start of hostilities.  This had been part of the 
Polish leadership’s attempt to avoid provoking its German neighbour by concentrating the army 
along border areas.  As Armengaud saw it, this catastrophic error had two important 
consequences.  First, it limited the number of Polish soldiers ready to receive the initial shock of 
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the Nazi attack to 700 000 soldiers.
54
  Had the Polish high command mobilized ahead of time, 
this number might have been raised to over two million.  As the German attack consisted of 1.2 
million men, early Polish mobilization would have given them a considerable advantage in 
manpower, if not in modern equipment and machines. 
Gamelin was determined not to make the same mistake. While war with Germany was 
declared by France on September 3
rd
, mobilization of the army started two days earlier on 
September 1
st
.  Over the next four weeks, France mobilized eight armies.  During this time, 
Gamelin strictly forbade any air attacks on Germany for fear of reprisals which would hinder 
mobilization.  Reports from Armengaud and Faury indicated the enormously disruptive effects of 
German air attacks on Polish mobilization.
55
  They also suggested that whatever forces were not 
in place at the beginning of hostilities stood very little chance of ever reaching their intended 
stations on the frontline.  This was because Luftwaffe operations had the effect of rendering 
transportation networks useless, mostly through bombing runs on railroads and major crossroads.  
Faury, the head of the French mission to Poland, summarized the matter most succinctly:  
The Polish command has already lost the battle because it does not have the 
necessary reserve units available to reinforce units under duress and seal the 
breaches which appear between them.  These reserves exist but the ability to 
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While these reports would have come to Gamelin’s attention several days too late to 
affect the course of French mobilization in early September, they were to have considerable 
impact on the generalissimo’s decisions throughout the eight months of Phoney War.  After all, 
Gamelin had watched his armies mobilize, unhindered by German reprisal on land and in the air, 
with enormous satisfaction.
57
  Once his troops were in place, he was loath to move them, even as 
the weeks of inactivity began to drag on.  According to some, these soldiers were needed 
elsewhere as French mobilization had taken place just as the harvest season was about to begin.  
The image of France’s countryside filling with harvest spoiling for want of labourers struck 
Prime Minister Daladier as intolerable and he lobbied energetically to have Gamelin release the 
agriculturalists stationed at the front lines.  Gamelin sharply reminded Daladier of “the 
possibility in a very short time, of Germany swinging back [west] with all her forces,”58 and 
refused to sacrifice a single soldier for the benefit of French farmlands while awaiting the 
unavoidable onslaught from the east.  The report from Poland was clear in summarizing, 
“Hitler’s goal is to destroy his enemies, one by one, in one all or nothing blow”.59  Gamelin had 
completed his mobilization and would not risk repeating the Polish error by diverting sizeable 
amounts of manpower to serve other purposes, however important.  
 
Lesson 2: The Ineffectiveness of Reserve Forces 
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In his report dated September 26
th
, Armengaud notes that reserves set aside by the Polish 
high command met the same fate as that of the army’s front line soldiers.  That is to say that 
movement was rendered impossible by the Luftwaffe’s interdiction of roads and railway 
junctions.  Local reserves were often cut off and surrounded before they could arrive at what 
they believed to be the front lines.  The speed and penetrative power of the German armored 
divisions coupled with the air-force’s close support, prevented Polish reinforcements from 
playing any appreciable role in the short war of September 1939.  
Gauché’s intelligence from the war in Poland increased Gamelin`s apprehension 
concerning the power of the German air force to dictate the outcome of battle.  Gauché warned 
of a “terrifying prelude to ground attack by a massive aerial bombardment of the HQs, 
communications, vulnerable areas.  Paralysis of the army from the opening stages of conflict.”60  
Just as Faury and Armengaud had previously reported from their first-hand observations, Gauché 
emphasised the inability of the high command to direct their intended battle in the face of 
repeated Luftwaffe interdiction.  “This is followed by powerful advances from armored 
divisions…which pierce deeply behind enemy lines.  It is not possible for displaced units to re-
establish themselves.  The chief of the 2ème bureau strongly anticipates the repetition of this type 
of attack on our own front” (author’s italics).61 
     Faury’s report in particular made this aspect of the Blitzkrieg perfectly clear.  In the French 
mission’s official report he wrote, “Polish reserves were attacked in their zones of concentration 
as their vanguards were arriving and their companions, obliged to abandon the devastated 
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railroads, could only arrive slowly and in small numbers.  In addition, they could only march at 
night.”62  Upon reading this and many other similar reports, Gamelin was compelled to think 
along different lines than the traditional view of placing large strategic reserves behind the front 
line.  Gauché, Faury and Armengaud had all informed him that this would not be an effective 
strategy faced with the new German tactics as displayed in Poland. 
 
2 – The “Culture” of the French Army 
 
Following the events in Poland, it became clear that the traditional notion of rushing 
strategic reserves to bolster flagging areas of the continuous front would no longer be effective.  
After September 1939, Gamelin began to search for alternative ways to ensure France’s 
inviolability.  Before looking into his conclusions on this matter, it will be helpful to consider the 
nature of the military machine over which he presided, and consider its basic doctrinal 
framework.  As a central purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how unorthodox Gamelin’s 
solutions were in addressing the problem of German breakthrough tactics, it will be necessary to 
first clarify the habits and procedures practiced by the French army as outlined in military 
manuals of the late 1930s.  Only then can one fully appreciate the radical nature of Gamelin’s 
revisions. 
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In Poland, Germany had shown that modern equipment and innovative tactics could 
restore mobility to battlefield.  The French army, however, remained steeped in the lessons 
which had eventually secured victory in the First World War.  What was the “culture” of the 
French army?  What ideological and methodological pillars supported its vast weight and defined 
its character?  Any answer to this question necessarily begins with the concept of the 
“methodical battle”.  This was an outgrowth of French experience from 1914-18.  In 1914, the 
French army entered into hostilities firmly tied to the concept of the “all-out offensive” 
(l’offensive à l’outrance).  This notion, which prioritized aggressive offensive operations, 
followed from the writings of Colonel Ardant du Picq.  According to du Picq, French defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian War was the result of passive and unaggressive tendencies within the army 
and its leadership.  In the years leading up to 1914, French doctrine increasingly supported the 
idea that high morale and ferocious waves of infantry charges could overwhelm the enemy.  
These ideas, though pursued doggedly by Generals Joffre and Nivelle until 1917, did not survive 
the trenches, barbed wire and machine guns of the western front. 
Late in the war, the methodical battle, a new set of principles aiming at the preservation 
of the chain of command and the conservation of lives and resources, exercised far greater 
influence on French strategists than previous notions of heroic élan vital.  The methodical battle 
emphasised the importance of firepower in deciding the outcome of battle.  While the infantry 
was still considered as “charged with the central role in combat,”63 artillery support was viewed 
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as absolutely essential to the success of any operation.  The 1937 military manual Instruction sur 
l’emploi tactique des Grandes Unités, which was often referred to as the “Gospel of the French 
army,”64 intersperses regular text with bold print in order to emphasize the core concepts of 
French military theory.  In this text, the largest such bold-printed section is found in the first 
section outlining the role of firepower.   
The effects of firepower are both material and moral.  It creates killing zones 
where troops suffer massive and shocking losses which neutralise their will to 





Firepower was key to the French army’s method of battle.  “Le Feu Tue” or “fire kills” as 
Marshal Pétain wrote in 1921,
66
 suggesting that artillery should always be used in close co-
operation with infantry movement.  Indeed, the ability of the infantry division to move at all was 
thought to be contingent upon the support it received from artillery barrages.  Command and 
coordination of the artillery was therefore relegated to the higher echelons of command.  French 
officers were taught that relinquishing command of a division’s artillery support to lower 
subordinates would lead to “isolated, disjointed, sterile local actions.”  To delegate command of 
artillery in such a way, especially in the heat of battle, was described as no less than an 
“abdication of command.”67   
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This coupling of infantry and artillery units fostered a pronounced top-down culture in 
the French army. Infantry was seen as mobile on the battlefield only insofar as its supporting 
artillery allowed it to be.  As the artillery was carefully co-ordinated by higher-level 
commanders, so too was the mobility of infantry divisions.  Ideally, battles took place after 
thorough preparation assuring advantages in men, materiel and battlefield position.  The goal 
was to “impose one’s will upon the enemy while…maintaining a strict economy of resources.”68  
This apparent contradiction implied that only through the application of strict, methodical 
preparation and execution could battle be successfully offered to the enemy.  This concept 
applied to both offensive and defensive operations.  Even “audacious solutions should be 
executed methodically,” explained the military manual of 1937 for the command of large units.69  
 Such principles necessarily slowed down the reaction time of the French army.  Junior 
officers were restricted in their maneuvers because their supporting artillery was commanded by 
senior officers.  This required a slow process of coordination between different echelons of 
command in order to execute basic movement.  Thus we can determine a “culture” that existed 
within the French army during the interwar years which emphasised the pairing of infantry and 
artillery, firepower and central command over mobility.  This is not to say that the French high 
command envisioned a static battlefield along the lines of 1914-18.  The instructional manual on 
the use of large units (1937) claims “the offensive is the mode of operations par 
excellence…only the offensive allows for decisive results.”70 Nevertheless, any offensive was 
seen as dependent upon an initial superiority in soldiers, equipment, morale, tactical doctrine, 
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strategic situation, and preparation.  The careful buildup of each of these elements was the 
responsibility of the high command and would require a time-consuming, deliberate procedure.  
Maneuver of artillery during combat was also a slow process which ran according to established 
timetables.  Displacement of 75mm cannon could take as much as three to four hours.  In the 
case of the 105mm cannon, this could take up to 10 hours, while setting up the piece for firing 
required anywhere between 2 and 10 additional hours.
71
  It is difficult to envision a sweeping 
forward movement of any sustained momentum by an army following such staccato patterns of 
advance.  Yet timetables of this sort were considered crucial to the success of the methodical 
battle, and were even applied to a new manual on the use of tanks as late as 1939.  In this manual 
the tank, like the infantry, was to follow strict patterns of movement in order to facilitate 
coordination with the artillery.  The tank was to advance only with the “protection and support” 
of the artillery and in “intimate liaison” with the infantry.72  Thus we see the potential of armored 
units for restoring mobility to the battlefield  tempered by French insistence on firepower as the 
keystone to success.  Movement, according to French strategic thought, was the result of a 
successful methodical battle which had already broken the enemy’s will and ability to fight.  It 
was not, as the Germans would see it, the key element in bringing about such a victory. 
 
In fact, during the interwar years, French military minds were developing the idea that 
divisional mobility was in fact decreasing as a result of the incorporation of modern weaponry.  
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Since the methodical battle tied heavy artillery pieces to infantry units, mobility was increasingly 
restricted.  One professor at St-Cyr military college noted that the greater number of horse and 
trucks required to move heavy equipment made the 1930 French division thirty-four km long 
while on the march.  The 1914 version of French infantry divisions on the march stretched out to 
only thirteen km in length or less than half of its future embodiment.  In the 1930s, French 
military instruction manuals pointed to the fact that the infantry division had become less, rather 
than more fluid in movement since the First World War.  They were “less supple and less 
tactically and strategically mobile.”73 
In its various manuals outlining official doctrine, the French high command referred to 
the subordination of mobility in favour of carefully orchestrated and consistent artillery support.  
Firepower trumped everything else and the enemy was to be met with “curtains of fire” at every 
encounter.  This summarized the methodical battle and stood in direct contrast to what the 
French high command feared most, the encounter battle.   
To meet the enemy in open terrain, forced to slug it out, fully exposed and deprived of 
the advantages of prepared defensive works, was anathema to most French military thinkers.  
Again in bold-print emphasis, the 1937 Instruction states: 
In general, and especially at the start of a war, it is important to fight 
methodical battles and to avoid battles of encounter.  The latter, in light of the 
risks which they entail, do not lend themselves well to the employment of 
young or inexperienced troops.  It is better, on the contrary, to only engage 
methodically on the battlefield, with all the necessary supporting firepower.
74
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Gamelin was fully immersed in this concept of methodical battle and had witnessed its 
inception and implementation during the First World War.
75
  Nevertheless, historians must 
attempt to come to terms with the generalissimo’s gradual but consistent revision of an 
intervention into Belgium which, as time went by, appeared increasingly contradictory to both 
the spirit and the letter of French military theory.   As will be explored in the next section, 
lessons learned from the Polish campaign were primarily responsible for convincing Gamelin to 
stray from orthodox French military planning.       
 




 1939 as the German campaign in Poland was coming to a close, 
Gamelin sent word to his “Commander of the Northeast Front”, General Georges, outlining his 
conception of how best to combat the new German tactics.
76
  This letter contains excellent advice 
and demonstrates that even at this early date, Gamelin was already familiar with the fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                             
dosage and in the most terrifying form” Charles de Gaulle, Vers L’Armée de Métier (Paris : Acabose, 1934), 151.   
De Gaulle goes on to write movingly on the opening days of the First World War, when thousands of French 
soldiers stumbled through their first, confused trial by fire.  From these two sources, we can see that fears 
concerning the efficacy of inexperienced troops were discussed as a potential liability against which precautions 
would need to be made.  Nevertheless, Gamelin left the center of his line manned with only a few inexperienced 
divisions of secondary fighting quality, or “B” divisions. 
75
 Resistance to modernization was viewed among many in the French army as a virtue.  The “Infantry 
Combat Handbook” of 1938 praised French tactics precisely because they did not innovate but “preserved from 
oblivion the lessons of WWI.  This was one of many publications which lauded the practice of resisting the 
temptation to depart from the lessons which had been so painfully learned in 1917-18.”  See Eugen Weber, The 
Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), 251. 
76
Gamelin, Servir I, 245. 
26 
 
principles of the blitzkrieg.  In it, he warns of the impact of German air support of ground 
operations and advises that armored counterattacks should be prioritized as the preferred method 
of countering armored breakthroughs in the French line of defence.  Most interestingly, Gamelin 
describes the importance of defence in depth.  He advises that Georges man the front line with 
the minimal possible number of soldiers to resist a German attack.  Reserves should be 
established in depth behind this first screen, two layers deep.  The first line of reserves should 
consist of infantry while the second line was to be made up of the more mobile forces: motorized 
units, cavalry
77
 and the heavy armored divisions (DCRs). 
The idea of a defence in depth, which Gamelin had also strongly emphasized to Polish 
Marshal Rydz-Smigly 
78
 before the war, is formally described in this letter.  Such methods were 
perfectly in keeping with official French military doctrine of the time.  The 1937 publication on 
the use of large military units states: “to sustain the effort demanded in battle, the commander 
requires a great number of reserves.  These are to be used in order to relieve troops engaged in 
combat, as well as to allow for combined operations.  The commander must continuously be 
mindful of their reconstitution.”79  And later in the same manual, we read: “Defensive 
deployment against armored vehicles is characterised by depth above all else.”80   Depth of 
defence was to be assured, not only through multiple “layers” of local reserves, but also from the 
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long-standing preference to conduct a forward defence of French territory, meeting any German 
attack on the Belgian Lowlands.    
Since the end of the First World War, French military planners had prepared for such a 
move into Belgium at the onset of any future war with Germany.  At a 1927 meeting of the 
Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, Marshal Pétain stressed the advantages to France inherent in a 
pre-emptive move into Belgium.  He argued that this was the only way to ensure a close 
cooperation between the two national armies.
81
  The merits of such a move were obvious; it 
would serve to support France’s Belgian ally while creating distance between the front lines and 
France’s own border. Even after 1936, when Belgian King Leopold II announced his country’s 
new policy of strict neutrality, French strategists continued to envision an eventual “rescue” of 
the Belgian army, putting distance between the front lines and France itself. By the time war was 
declared, this long-held strategy had taken two basic forms, the Escaut Plan and the more 
ambitious Dyle Plan. 
The Escault Plan, or “Plan E”, was a forward movement to the Scheldt river, hinging on 
the Belgian “redoubt” of Ghent.82  Its advantages included a greater depth of defense, meeting 
the German forces at a distance from France’s vital industrial northeast.  The Escaut Plan would 
also allow France to incorporate the retreating twenty-two Belgian divisions following their 
initial resistance on the Albert Canal.  Finally, it would provide a strong defensive line behind 
the river which, it was hoped, would have been already fortified by the neutral Belgians.  This 
was a modest intervention into Belgium which would screen a narrow strip of coastline and a 
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few ports to the west of the Scheldt river.  The bulk of Belgium’s territory would remain 
unprotected and presumably sacrificed to Germany, at least for the opening stages of the war.   
The inherent risk within the plan was that the French high command would remain 
unsure of the extent of Belgian preparations.  That is, they would not be able to verify the level 
of fortification which awaited them on the west bank of the Scheldt river. Nevertheless, any 
footrace with the German army into Belgium would be aided by the fact that every location 
along the proposed line of defence, including Antwerp, the furthest point of advance from the 
French border, was closer to France than it was to Germany.  This was an acceptable risk even in 
light of the recent demonstrations of German mobility in Poland. 
 In 1939, Gamelin expanded the scope of Belgian intervention by developing the Dyle 
Plan or “Plan D”.  This consisted of a deeper push into Belgium, with a view to taking up 
positions on the Dyle river line where it joined the Meuse.  It offered the advantage of shortening 
the front line of defence from 750km to 680km
83
.  It also aimed at preserving the majority of 
Belgian territory from being overrun while simultaneously depriving Germany of some 
important Channel ports.  This last consideration was a matter of considerable interest to 
France’s allies in Britain. Another advantage offered by this more ambitious excursion into 
Belgian territory, was that future offensives against Germany, which Gamelin had in mind for 
1941 or 1942, would begin from a shorter striking distance to the industrial Ruhr region
84
. 
Such advantages were noteworthy, but the Dyle Plan failed to take into account a number 
of fundamental risks which should have, according to French military doctrine, dissuaded 
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Gamelin from adopting the maneuver.  First, the Dyle Plan was considerably more adventurous 




 army as well 
as the British Expeditionary Force were expected to advance some 60km further than allocated in 
the Escaut Plan.
85
  The motorized and mechanized units within these armies were capable of 
conducting such a headlong rush but even these mobile units were trained to act in accordance 
with the tenets of the methodical battle from the moment they disembarked from their transports.  
Though both plans required a rapid advance on the part of France’s northern armies, this 
should not be interpreted as a new preference for greater mobility within the French army.  
Gamelin envisioned no such break from the principles of the methodical battle.  Rather, the rush 
into Belgium was intended only as a rapid redeployment to new defensive lines.  Upon 
encountering the enemy, French units were expected to resume the practice of methodical battle, 
moving at the pace of infantry, and supported by lengthy artillery barrages.
86
 Large motorized 
groups under fire by enemy air forces were expected to leave the road and travel over country.  If 
French units were challenged by the Luftwaffe anywhere en route to the Dyle, off road travel 
would have reduced speed considerably.  In such conditions, French units would have been hard 
pressed to reach the Dyle ahead of German spearhead units. 
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 armies along with the BEF could 
arrive at their positions with sufficient time to deploy their artillery, a process which, as 
mentioned, could take as long as 10 hours for the more modern 105mm cannon.  It was 
optimistic in the extreme to think that advance units of any German attack would fail to reach the 
Dyle before the French had dug in and prepared for a methodical defensive battle relying 
primarily on firepower.  And yet, anything less than this would constitute a battle of encounter, 
the very thing most French military planners were determined to avoid.  Despite the risks, 
Gamelin committed himself to the Dyle Plan on November 15
th
, 1939 in his Instruction 




4 - Gamelin’s “Solutions” 
 
This overview of French military doctrine and strategy as it existed in the 1930s has been 
necessary in order to explore the striking unorthodoxy of Gamelin’s response to the events in 
Poland.  The present section will explore the novel solutions devised by Gamelin to resist 
German Blitzkrieg tactics.  From September 1939 to May 1940, France’s Commander-in-Chief 
engaged in a fateful re-imagining of the role played by strategic reserves in the upcoming battle.  
This evolution in his line of thought can be traced back to the first ‘tweaking’ of the Dyle Plan, 
shortly after the earliest lessons drawn from Poland had been learned.  
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The Dyle Plan, in its original conception, involved ten French and five British divisions. 
The vast majority of France’s remaining divisions remained integrated in what Karl-Heinz 
Frieser has aptly referred to as the “safe French tree trunk”88.  Reserves at this point were 
considerable, including the 7
th
 army, an elite mobile and coherent unit, stationed near the center 
of the French line, near Reims. 
This would be continually revised by the generalissimo who began to see the Dyle Plan 
in ever more ambitious terms.  By September 1939, Gamelin increased the number of divisions 
on his left wing from fifteen to twenty two.  This included many of his most mobile units.  A 
further amendment to this order of battle came on October 11
th
 when he ordered the Seventh 
army removed from the strategic reserve and moved into the army’s left wing near Antwerp.  
There its commander, General Henri Giraud, would remain, ready to act as operational reserve.  
This now increased the forces involved in the Dyle Plan from twenty-two to twenty-nine 
divisions. 
Following the events in Poland, Gamelin continued to systematically incorporate ever 
increasing numbers of his reserve units into front-line service. The process culminated on March 
20
th
 1940 when Gamelin introduced his “Breda Variant”.   This strategy proposed the full 
integration of the Seventh Army into the French front line.  This mobile force would be pushed 
forward into Belgium and beyond, rushing toward Breda in support of the Dutch army.  The 
“Breda Variant” to the Dyle Plan was formally adopted on March 12th, 1940 as part of Gamelin’s 
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Instruction Personelle et Secrète no. 11.
89
  In accordance with this revision, the number of 
divisions committed to the mobile French left wing had risen to thirty, including elite motorized 
and mechanized units.  It came at the expense of France’s strategic reserve.  This was Giraud’s 
Seventh army which consisted of one DLM (light armored division), two motorized divisions 
and three class “A” infantry divisions.  The new mission assigned to this force was especially 
risky as it required General Giraud’s army to reach a point twice as far from France as it was 
from Germany.
90
  Moreover, it would commit these forces to the far left of the Allied line, 
without any knowledge of where the main German effort would take place.   
 
The Breda Variant was a bizarre reversal of policy on Gamelin’s part.  Not only was he 
thinning out his reserves, he was simultaneously bulking up his front line – exactly the opposite 
of what he advised for Georges on September 21
st
 (see pages 25-26).  Instead of ensuring layers 
of reserves, consistent with French army doctrine, he incorporated the bulk of his reserves into 
the front line.  Furthermore, the Dyle-Breda Plan substantially increased the risk of an encounter 
battle with German spearheads thrusting westward through Belgium.  Official French doctrine 
clearly stated that a commander should at all costs avoid such an engagement, choosing instead 
the pre-planned methodical battle.  Instruction sur l’Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unités 
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stipulates an important detail justifying this preference, one which should have been of particular 
interest to Gamelin in the winter of 1939.  It stressed the danger of an encounter battle, 
particularly for unseasoned soldiers facing an enemy which had already experienced battle.
91
 
If some feared the risk carried by the Escaut Plan of meeting fast moving German armor 
somewhere in the open countryside before defensive positions could be properly occupied, the 
revised Dyle-Breda plan increased this risk considerably.  The intended positions along the Dyle 
river were only slightly closer to the French border than they were to Germany.  Considering that 
Gamelin encouraged movement by night only, in order to minimise contact with enemy aircraft, 
the risk of encountering advance German units was, if not assured, then certainly worthy of 
careful consideration.  Gamelin accepted this risk despite having no way to verify what 
fortifications had been prepared by Belgian engineers, particularly in the Gembloux Gap.  This 
was 25 miles of open, flat countryside between Namur and Wavre.  Through this area, Gamelin 
expected the main weight of the German offensive to fall.  Anything short of complete defensive 
preparations would guarantee the kind of encounter battle French military doctrine insisted 
Gamelin should make every effort to avoid. 
In the end, the Gembloux Gap was not fortified to the extent anticipated by the French 
high command.  The “barrage de Cointet”, a tank obstacle constructed by Belgian engineers 
around Gembloux was ineffective due to large gaps in its line.  There, on May 14-15, General 
Prioux’s cavalry corps would encounter Hoepner’s Panzer divisions in open terrain without the 
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advantage of prepared positions or pre-planned “curtains” of supporting artillery fire which 
characterised the methodical battle.  About the defensive works prepared ahead of time by 
Belgian engineers, Prioux gave the following brief description, “No serious trench work, no 
wire...almost barren.”92 
In his memoirs, Gamelin attempts to minimize the importance of the Breda Variant to the 
outcome of the Battle of France.  He describes the dash to Breda as an “hors d’oeuvre”93 of little 
importance to the French defence incorporating over a hundred divisions.  He argues that the 
misallocation of such a relatively small portion of available resources cannot be blamed for the 
disaster which befell the French army in May 1940.  His argument that the maneuver involved 
only three divisions
94
 can only be interpreted as deliberately disingenuous as Giraud’s army was 
composed of six elite divisions (1
st









 infantry and 21
st
 infantry).  Furthermore, in removing these forces from the strategic reserve 
(the name of this assembly until the adoption of the Breda variant was 1
st
 army group reserve
95
), 
Gamelin forced General Georges to replace them with most of the remaining reserve divisions.  
To back up 1
st
 army`s crucial blocking of the Gembloux Gap, Georges replaced the departed 




 DCRs, the 43
rd
 Infantry Division and the 1
st
 North African 
Division. 
 In his attempt to downplay the relative importance of the Breda Variant Gamelin 
neglects to mention the striking inconsistency between this plan and the Dyle maneuver as it had 
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been conceived before March 1940.  That is to say that one of the Dyle Plan’s chief advantages 
was in its shortening of the French line of battle.  This was among the main selling points which 
had allowed Gamelin to have the plan officially adopted by the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.  
However, by including the Breda Variant, Gamelin was now extending the line again by another 
50 kilometers, thus, removing the principle advantage gained by the Dyle Plan over its 
predecessor while simultaneously increasing the risk of an encounter battle with advancing 
German units.  
When all the reshuffling was done in March of 1940, the center of the French line, which 
had once been backed up by Giraud`s powerful and mobile Seventh army stationed around 
Reims, was now essentially deprived of anything beyond local reserves.  These were mostly “B” 
divisions of questionable reliability.  The Breda Variant began this reorganization which 
ultimately left Georges unable to rush sufficient forces to plug the breach around Sedan when 
German tanks began to stream over the Meuse on the 12
th
 of May. This is why Gamelin`s 
memoirs must be read with scepticism when he dismisses the Breda Variant as “merely an 
appetizer”.  Similarly, his memoirs miss the mark when he writes that General Georges had 28 
reserve divisions at his disposal with which to counter any German breakthrough.
96
  In fact, 
Georges did not possess enough reserves geographically positioned to guarantee the center of the 
French line.
97
  This was because his Commander-in-Chief had already sent the best and most 
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mobile elements available to the far left of the French order of battle before rushing it headlong 
into Holland.  
Georges had identified the danger to the French center long before the German attack and 
objected to the deployment of so many divisions into Belgium.  His opposition to the Dyle Plan 
was presented officially for the first time on November 30
th
 in a letter to Gamelin.  This 
document stated, “In case of an enemy attack in strength on the center of our line...we could be 
deprived of the necessary means to strike back.”98  Undeterred, Gamelin deliberately excluded 
Georges from meetings in which he attempted to convince military and civilian leaders of the 
merits of his Breda Variant.  Jeffery Gunsberg has pointed to a particularly crucial meeting of 
military chiefs in November 1939 where Gamelin “sold” his idea to Billotte (Chief of First Army 
Group), Giraud (future commander of the 7
th
 army, charged with executing the Breda Variant), 
Darlan (Admiral of the Fleet) and D’Astier (Chief of Air Operations in the North) while 
neglecting to inform Georges of the meeting.
99
 The absence of Gamelin’s chief subordinate for 
the Northeast Front points to the deep division that had already developed between the two men 
over the issue of sending mobile reserves to Holland.   
During the final weeks before the German attack, General Georges proposed ways in 
which sufficient reserves could yet be reclaimed from Gamelin’s bulked-up front line.  It was 
still not too late to reconsider the Breda Variant, Georges argued. This would conserve five 
divisions (one of the six divisions slated to participate in this operation would be kept on the far 
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left of the French line).  Not proceeding into Belgium, or at least choosing the less ambitious 
Escaut Plan over the Dyle Plan, would conserve fifteen more divisions, according to Georges.
100
  
Such recommendations fell on deaf ears as by now Gamelin was fully committed to the 




Georges’ efforts to scale back French commitment to military intervention into Belgium 
can be coupled with his aforementioned objection to the Dyle-Breda Plan of November 30
th
 1939 
to suggest that Georges would have been less taken in by the Belgian feint had he been in 
Gamelin’s place.  Ernest R. May argues that in fact, Georges would have done no better than his 
superior as he essentially believed in a similar deployment of French armies.  May argues that 
Georges objected to everything Gamelin decided upon not from personal conviction, but rather 
as a way to gain favour with Gamelin’s political opponents, in particular Paul Reynaud.101  
May’s argument does not give Georges’ prescience enough credit.  Whether or not he was in part 
politically motivated, it remains true that Georges was able to identify France’s vulnerability to 
an attack in the center.   Had he succeeded in obtaining a more solid reinforcement of this region, 
it becomes impossible to imagine a scenario in which German Panzers could have broken 
through as quickly as they did along the Meuse. 
The move from the Escaut to the Dyle-Breda Plan was the result of Gamelin’s radical re-
defining of his strategy subsequent to the war in Poland.  Lessons from that conflict had 
impressed upon him the need to increase as much as possible the number of effectives manning 
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front line positions.  Risking an encounter battle was worth the addition of 22 Belgian divisions 
in addition to the 10 Dutch divisions which Gamelin hoped would rally around Giraud’s Seventh 
army in Breda.  Since he believed he was facing as many as 150 German divisions, as well as the 
probable impact of massed armor somewhere along his extended front, these additions were 
paramount in his thoughts.  German armored breakthroughs in Poland were observed by the 
Deuxième Bureau to have taken place over a front of between two to four kilometers in width.  
These operations were said to be pursued with the greatest vigor using armor, planes and 
artillery.
102
  Such information must have made the strongest impression on Gamelin who was 
tasked with defending 680 km of front line, any 2-4 of which could be the location of Germany`s 
main effort at breakthrough.  The Polish war had convinced Gamelin that the traditional use of 
reserve forces could not effectively serve in the defence of France.  Since reserve forces in 
Poland had been immobilised by the speed of the German tank/plane tandem in battle, Gamelin 
opted instead for a new and untried strategy.  He threw the vast majority of his reserves into the 
front lines, particularly among those forces intended for Holland and Belgium, where he 
expected the main German effort to take place. The Breda Variant was only the most famous of 
these efforts and cannot be taken as an isolated miscalculation on Gamelin’s part, but rather as an 




Nicole Jordan has argued that Gamelin had been experimenting with a redefinition of the 
French strategic reserve since 1936.  According to this revision the strategic reserve was no 
longer defined as an uncommitted force on French soil to be called to any point on the 
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continuous front as needed.  Rather it would be a highly specialised mobile force to be 
committed to the Low Countries in the critical first days of conflict.  Jordan calls it a 
“modernised strategic reserve.”103  In fact, Gamelin did not begin to significantly reassign his 
strategic reserve until after the Polish campaign.  And by committing his reserve to the front line, 
it ceased to act in any meaningful way as a reserve force.  “On a continuous front like ours,” 
Gamelin wrote, “there could be no question, as some have supposed, of placing in reserve an 
organized army.”104  It is thus more accurate to call Gamelin’s redeployment an elimination of 
France’s reserve in favour of a more powerful front line – rather than a “modernization” or 
“reorganization” which somehow maintained the Seventh Army’s identity as a reserve force, as 
Jordan suggests.  
  
5 – The Great Gamble 
 
In any event, since the maneuver was to fail completely in its stated goal of linking up 
with retreating units of the Dutch army, the Breda Variant can only be credited with distancing 
Georges’ most cohesive and mobile reserve forces away from the centre of the French line where 
they would be needed most.  The reason why this army failed to link up with its allies in Breda 
lay in the decision by the Dutch to retreat their army north, rather than south, toward “Fortress 
Holland”.  This fundamental lack of co-ordination with his allies appears striking when one 
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considers that Gamelin would risk such a valuable asset without first acquiring more information 
on the Dutch plan of battle.  More striking still, is the fact that Gamelin had already received 
warnings before May 1940, indicating that the Dutch planned to retreat north, away from Breda, 
in the event of a German attack.
105
    
The Breda Variant constituted an aggressive gamble to attempt the formation of a 
continuous allied front stretching from the Ardennes to Breda.  It is important to note that no 
formal accord to this effect had been concluded between the French and their Belgian/Dutch 
allies-in-waiting.
106
  Moreover, the Dutch decision to retreat northwards, away from Giraud`s 
advancing 7th army resulted from a lack of coordination between the Belgians and Dutch 
themselves.  Belgian strategists had no interest in compromising their initial stance along the 
Albert Canal by stretching out their left wing to link up with Dutch units
107
.  Therefore, we can 
be certain that Gamelin rushed his strategic reserve toward Breda without co-ordinating this 
move beforehand with Dutch or Belgian officials.  In addition to this inexplicable oversight, 
Gamelin had not received any assurance that the Dutch and Belgians were prepared to assist one 
another in a common defence along the Dyle.  Clearly, they were not, as demonstrated by the 
direction of the Dutch retreat.
108
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The prospect of including thirty two Belgian and Dutch divisions within his continuous 
front appeared necessary to Gamelin due to the steady stream of alarmist and factually incorrect 
estimates of German military strength provided to him by the Deuxième Bureau.  The dizzying 
extent of his gamble demonstrates the desperation with which Gamelin labored to address this 
perceived numerical inferiority.  The Breda Variant, as noted elsewhere
109
, did not suffer from a 
methodical excess, but rather from a total lack of method.  It was at such a distance from the 
“culture” of the army tasked with its execution as to render positive results extremely doubtful.  
It was a giant leap, not only from French military doctrine emphasising the methodical battle, but 
also from Gamelin’s own previously held views.  Prior to the war, he expressed a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for any pre-emptive move into Belgium.  Paul de Villelume, military advisor to 
Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, cites Gamelin speaking to him several times before 1939 in a 
desultory tone, about the risks involved in such an operation.  “On April 6th, 1937, he told me 
that he would never agree to come to Belgium`s assistance if that country did not request such 
aid before the beginning of hostilities.”110  Gamelin was adamant at this stage, two and a half 
years before the war began, that he did not wish to engage in an improvised operation, without a 
clear understanding between French and Belgian Chiefs-of-Staff.  He refused to recklessly throw 
his divisions into battles of encounter like wood in a furnace.  “Until the fall of 1939, [Gamelin] 
never ceased to condemn the folly of our eventual entry into Belgium”.111  Indeed, as late as 
Sept. 1
st
 1939, Gamelin wrote to Daladier: “If the Belgians don’t call on our support until the 
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moment in which they’re attacked...we would be forced to rush into an encounter battle with the 
added difficulty of supporting a retreating army – a very difficult task with modern equipment 
and aviation.”112 
 
Gamelin’s caution, so evident before the Polish war, was again seen in his disapproval of 
a Saar offensive in September 1939.  Voices in the government promoted this attack as a 
political necessity in order to fulfill the minimum of France’s obligations to Poland.  For his part, 
Gamelin regarded it as unnecessarily risky.  He disapproved of the plan because any move into 
the Saar would require enough units that guardianship over the Belgian and Swiss borders would 
become uncertain.
113
  Though he disapproved of the idea, he conducted the operation according 
to his own methods which, at this stage, still dovetailed perfectly with contemporary French 
doctrine.  He planned the attack as “a series of powerful actions, fiercely mounted, and 
methodologically conducted.”114 
However, the hard lesson of the Polish campaign had impressed upon Gamelin the idea 
that only the strongest possible front line could hope to blunt the impact of massed German 
armor. Armengaud’s report had counselled Gamelin to reject any maneuver like Joffre’s retreat 
to the Marne in 1914.  Given the mobility and air superiority enjoyed by the German military, 
any large scale retreat would soon become a rout.
115
 Once broken, the line was not likely to be 
reconstituted by local reserves since fast moving German aviation and armor would prevent their 
deployment.  Accordingly, Gamelin’s strategy shifted dramatically from a defence in depth to 
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strengthening his front line to its maximum potential.  This is precisely what the Poles failed to 
do, choosing to fight instead along their extended border with the Reich.  When war began, 
multiple German breakthroughs easily pierced the thinly held line which was far too long to be 
covered adequately by the Polish army.  Time and again, members of the French mission 
observed Polish soldiers pinned down by continuous strafing and low level bombing.  At the 
onset of battle, Polish reserve units were paralysed by German air attacks, which effectively 
prevented the timely mobilization and concentration of reinforcements.  Similarly, these attacks 
severed Polish units from communication with their high command.  
Gamelin feared that once battle was joined, he might be stripped of the ability to 
command, coordinate and concentrate large reserve units by a German airforce which the 
Deuxième Bureau had only recently assured him outnumbered the French air force eight to one.   
Similar problems could be expected due to the impact of German armored units which the same 
official source informed him would outnumber French totals by as much as three to one.  This is 
why Gamelin sacrificed most of his reserves and thrust them into the front lines.  There, he 
hoped, they would at least be able to take part in actively holding the line, rather than suffer the 
same paralysis which immobilized Polish reserves.  With this in mind, the famous exchange 
between Gamelin and Winston Churchill on the morning of May 16
th  
1940  acquires new 
significance.  As the Panzers raced toward the Channel, Churchill asked, “Où est la masse de 
manoeuvre?” (Where is the strategic reserve?).  To which Gamelin curtly replied, “There are 
none.” Churchill voiced the confusion which many historians have experienced when 
considering Gamelin’s apparent incompetence in failing to provide such a crucial element for the 




I was dumbfounded.  What were we to think of the great French army and its 
highest chiefs?  It had never occurred to me that any commanders having to 
defend five hundred miles of engaged front would have left themselves 
unprovided with a mass of maneuver.  I admit this was one of the greatest 






Churchill could not have known that French strategic planning had wagered everything 
on meeting the German army in Belgium and fighting it to a standstill.  Gamelin’s hope to 
saturate the battlefields until at least 1941 when buildup of Allied forces would allow for an 
offensive against Germany, would not be realised.  Instead, his guess proved incorrect and 
France was forced to witness its best forces cut off by a German attack in the center of the line 
opposite the Ardennes forest.  This was not a tragic oversight on the part of the French high 
command, but rather a deliberate, albeit risky, redeployment of forces specifically intended to 
solve the problems which had surfaced during the Polish campaign.  In Gamelin’s mind it was a 
calculated gamble intended to strengthen his front line, lend greater aid to Holland and avoid the 
devastating paralysis which plagued the Polish reserves in September 1939.  
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6 – The Problem of Limited Resources 
 
In such ways, Gamelin had definitively broken away from French military doctrine and 
risked an encounter battle in Belgium while depriving France of strong reserve forces in case of 
breakthrough.  In his mind, the new form of warfare used by Germany called for innovative 
solutions.  He knew that when the tide broke, and the time arrived to enact the long-awaited 






 armies (alongside 
the B.E.F.) intended for this dash would need to waste no time in setting up positions in support 
of the Belgian divisions whose addition to the allied cause Gamelin was so eager to recruit.  This 
explains the number of rash mobilizations which shook up the French army from October 1939 
to May 1940.  The most famous of these took place following the so-called “Mechelen Incident” 
when plans for the Nazi invasion of Western Europe, Fall Gelb, were captured by Belgian 
military police from the contents of a downed surveillance plane.  During this and other false 
alarms (notably those of January 15
th
 and April 11
th
), Gamelin tipped his hand to the German 
intelligence bureau (OKH), signaling his intention to rush several army groups into Belgium at 
the onset of hostilities.  The advantages offered to German strategists in receiving this 
information cannot be overstated.  “By the spring of 1940,” wrote Heinz Guderian, leader of the 
XIX army corps: 
 
We Germans had gained a clear picture of the enemy’s dispositions…from 
their order of battle, it was plain that the enemy expected the Germans to 
attempt the Schlieffen Plan again and that they intended to bring the bulk of the 
46 
 
allied armies against the anticipated out-flanking  through Holland and 
Belgium…A sufficient safeguard of the hinge of their proposed advance into 
Belgium by reserve units – in the areas, say, of Charleville and Verdun – was 
not apparent.  It seemed that the French high command did not regard any 






Despite the danger inherent in repeatedly showing the enemy the direction of one’s 
strategic plans, Gamelin felt obliged to waste no time in preparing to cross the Belgian border 
immediately following the first signs of German attack.  In his estimation, events in Poland had 
shown how difficult it could be to move armies and reinforcements to their intended area of 
deployment once German aerial attacks began in earnest.  Gamelin’s plan was to move into 
Belgium without delay, believing that an unhesitating sense of purpose was worth more than 
keeping his plans absolutely secret from the enemy at all costs.  His Commander of the Northeast 
Front, General Georges, voiced his concern during one such false alarm.  Gamelin rebuked him 
saying, “I have taken a position.  I cannot go back on it.  You have to know what you want.  
Otherwise you can’t wage war.”118.   
Doubt concerning the ability of reserve units to reach the front lines unmolested by the 
German air force was not the only reason behind Gamelin’s decision to commit the bulk of his 
strategic reserve before the battle had begun.  Also weighing heavily on his mind was the method 
in which the Germans had used their tank forces in Poland.  Unprecedented concentration of 
armor was reported as characteristic of the new German method of war.  Particularly noteworthy, 
Armengaud claimed in his September 26
th
 report, was the pattern of encirclement which often 
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followed the initial breakthrough by Panzer units.  Whenever Polish units began to retreat, they 
were pursued by German infantry engaging them, slowing their progress.  Simultaneously, 
armored units were sent to outstrip the retreating Poles and cut them off from supply.  
Armengaud observed this same tactic used repeatedly and almost always successfully.
119
 
Thus, the news from Poland presented Gamelin with an additional reason to deplete his 
reserves and incorporate them into the front lines before battle was actually joined.  Lessons 
from Poland had shown the vital importance of preventing German breakthrough anywhere 
along France’s 680 km of continuous front.  While this would be true in any war, during any era, 
it was of paramount importance after the Polish conflict, when motorised/mechanised 
exploitation of any gap in the line went far beyond anything seen before in the history of warfare.  
If reserves could be expected to be pinned down and cut off by aerial interdiction, Gamelin 
thought it wiser to throw them into the initial confrontation where they could at least make their 
presence felt.  His goal was to “saturate” the battlefield where he expected the main German 
attack to take place with soldiers and equipment.   He wrote:  
In a closed battlefield, a confined space, the French and German armies would 
very soon be able to saturate the terrain. Now the experience of the last war 
shows that if empty spaces initially allowed maneuver, the saturation of fronts 
rapidly led to a balance of forces which could only be broken after a painful 
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Gamelin’s view of modern war resembled a “mechanised Battle of the Somme,”121 a 
static clash of men and machines without significant movement.  In such an environment, a point 
of “saturation” is eventually reached where additional forces are irrelevant - they simply cannot 
fit onto the field of battle. 
Thus, if the Germans were expected to use unheard-of concentrations of armor to effect a 
breakthrough in the front line, Gamelin had another good reason for solidifying that front line to 
its maximum potential in order to meet the original onslaught head on and, hopefully, blunt its 
advance.  As Armengaud warned Gamelin on October 3
rd
 1939, “if a battle on the borders was 
lost due to a German breakthrough, through which the enemy sent the bulk of their armored 
divisions, preceded by their air force, the battle of France would be irredeemably lost.”122  
Gamelin tried to ensure that France would survive the opening round of hostilities by flooding 
the expected Belgian battlefield with enough men and materiel to create the kind of stalemate 
seen during the First World War. 
How confident could Gamelin feel about his chances of holding his newly reinforced line 
against the new German Blitzkrieg tactics?  It bears repeating that Gamelin’s own post-war 
estimates for the number of German tanks used in Fall Gelb was set in his memoirs between 
4000 and 5000.  The worst case scenario envisioned by the Deuxième Bureau raised that number 
to 10 000.  Gamelin’s sense of France’s military inferiority to the Reich was exacerbated by his 
intimate knowledge of material shortfalls within the French army.  The brief and half-hearted 
French incursion into the Saar in September 1939 gave ample indication of France’s lack of 
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preparation for an extended conflict.  Tanks in General Réquin’s 4th Army used up one third of 
their ammunition stockpile during this very limited engagement, despite firing no more than 
thirty rounds per tank.
123
  Things did not improve in the months that followed as bottlenecks in 
industrial production due to shortages in manpower and machine tools persisted.  If the French 
army found itself forced to fight in January, during the Mechelen alarm for instance, most 
artillery pieces (75mm cannons, 105s and 47mm anti-tank guns) would have stopped firing after 
two months at a projected firing rate of 3 500 000 shells per month.
124
   
Such deficiencies in the equipment used by the French military were soon addressed.  
Subsequent to the Polish surrender – and only then –  Gamelin embarked on fundamental 
changes to the composition of the army.  Chief among these was the rapid establishment of 
heavy armored divisions.  As early as Dec. 6
th
, General Billotte was urging the high command to 
oversee the formation of such divisions as an effective counter-punch to the power of the 
German Panzerdivisionen.
125
 Martin Alexander has argued that Gamelin shared these views and 
had to fight the resistance of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre in order to create France’s only 
large armored unit prior to 1939, the experimental heavy tank division.  Alexander concludes 
that “Gamelin was undoubtedly one of the French Generals most favorably disposed to the 
offensive organization of the army through the use of mechanical power.” and labored to 
convince the civilian government of the merits of armored divisions.
126
  Certainly mechanization 
of the French land forces did benefit from the efforts of a small number of champions during the 
interwar period.  In 1922, General Estienne wrote of the tank as “an independent weapon, which 
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admirably complemented the airplane.”127  General Doumenc, Gamelin’s future Chief of Staff, 
encouraged the creation of mixed armored divisions as early as 1928.  De Gaulle famously 
promoted the development of large armored formations in his study, Vers L’Armée de Métier 
(1934). General Héring was the only member of the C.S.G. to recommend organizing armored 
divisions as independent units, possessing their own artillery, communications, supply, air 
defense and maintenance support.
128
   It is inaccurate however, to include Gamelin among this 
group of forward thinking military minds who were able to grasp the potential of armored 
divisions before they were put to the test for the first time on a large scale in Poland.
129
  Prior to 
this display, Gamelin had a very flawed concept of the use of massed armor on the battlefield.  
He never envisioned large tank formations as capable of producing decisive operational results 
on their own.  Rather, he viewed them as mobile firepower, to be used in keeping with the tenets 
of the methodical battle.
130
  He spoke repeatedly of his opinions on these matters before the 
outbreak of war.  In so doing, he displayed obvious skepticism for the potential of massed tanks 
as a means to re-establish strategic mobility to the battlefield.  Shortly before the Polish 
campaign, Gamelin replied testily to General Flavigny’s request for the immediate formation of a 
third Division Légère Mécanique (DLM).  “You’re annoying me (vous m’embettez) with your 
DLMs.  There are already two in place.  That’s more than we need.  In any event, there wouldn’t 
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be enough room between the Maginot Line and the sea to maneuver them.”131  Later, challenged 
by the Conseil Supérieur de la Défence Nationale (CSDN) about the discrepancy between 
France’s three armored divisions versus the nine reported German ones, he exclaimed: “It isn’t 
because the Germans are committing an enormous error that we should emulate them!  You 
understand that there will never exist a battlefield vast enough to permit the deployment of 
several divisions like those you are proposing.”132  In his towering work, Les Français de l’An 
’40,  Crémieux-Brilhac reached the conclusion that “For France’s inability to properly provide 
itself with armor, General Gamelin bears the decisive responsibility.”133  By this, Crémieux-
Brilhac refers not to the number or quality of French tanks, which in both cases exceeded their 
German counterparts.  Rather, he is speaking of the inability of the French high command to 
mould its armored vehicles into effective divisions capable of fighting a modern, mobile war.  
Gamelin’s own comments on the unwieldiness of massed armour lends considerable weight to 
this argument.  Gamelin’s statements point to his conclusion, prior to September 1939, that tanks 
could not be used, without supporting units, to breach a continuous front like the one he had 
established on France’s Northeast Front. 
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The Polish campaign however, decisively proved the value of armored divisions.  It 
radically changed Gamelin’s views on the matter and impressed upon him the error of his earlier 
notions concerning massed tank operations.
134
  As a result, by early 1940, two new heavy 
armored divisions (with a third in assembly) and one new DLM were organized.  The fact that 
these were thrown into battle in May 1940 after only a few months training and without 
committed air support speaks to the novelty of such ideas within the army.  French armored units 
remained under-trained until the outbreak of hostilities.  This had been a long standing problem 
of which Gamelin was well aware.  The reason for this, again, was a lack of resources.  Major 
exercises for large units were cancelled in 1937 and 1938 due to shortfalls in ammunition and 
equipment.  These exercises would have been the only chance prior to the war for French 
Generals to practice large scale armored maneuvers and draw practical lessons from them.  The 




In terms of anti-tank guns, the situation was even more alarming.   The new 47 mm gun 
(an excellent weapon capable of penetrating the armor of any German tank) had, at the time of 
the Polish campaign, been distributed to only 16 out of 67 mobilized infantry divisions.  Another 
24 had been given 75mm batteries as an alternative.  The remaining 27 divisions, more than a 
third of France’s mobilized army, had to fend for themselves using the older 25mm gun which 
                                                 
134
 At the Vichy appointed Riom Trial in 1942, Gamelin claimed to have been committed to the 
establishment of armored divisions as early as 1935 and would have done more in this regard were it not for the 
opposition he encountered from members of the civilian government.  It is interesting to note that two of the 
foremost of these, Blum and Daladier also made similar claims.  Daladier professed to have been convinced of the 
merits of armored divisions as of 1933.  Blum claimed to have become a supporter of mechanization after 1935.  See 
Henri Michel, Le Procès de Riom, 217. 
135
Henri  Dutailly. Les Problèmes de l’Armée de Terre Française, 1935-40 (Paris: Service Historique de 
l’Armée, 1980), 227-44. 
53 
 
had little chance against the German Panzer IIIs and IVs.  In addition, only 10 of the remaining 
divisions enjoyed the regulation number of these largely ineffective weapons.
136
  
This insufficiency in the number of anti-tank weapons was all the more alarming when 
considered alongside General George’s own study on the Polish campaign.  Georges, who would 
direct the battle against Germany on France`s Northeast Front from May 10-19
th
, stressed the 
importance of the anti-tank gun in countering an enemy attempt at armored breakthrough.  
According to him, it was “the decisive weapon, provided it is well utilized, mobile and in great 
supply, and provided there is a vast store of extremely mobile reserves at the ready.”137  Gamelin 




However, Gamelin was also aware that he did not possess anywhere near the number of 
modern anti-tank weapons required to put Georges’ plan into action.  He understood the 
impossibility of French industry meeting such demands, and instead focused on available 
alternatives, like fortifications and artillery of all sizes and calibres.  Given France’s industrial 
limitations, improvisation and careful prioritizing became necessary.
139
  “One must be ready,” 
                                                 
136
 Minart II, p.70-5, 79-81. 
137
 Thierry Sarmant, “Prélude à Juin 1940: Le Commandement Français et les enseignements de la 
Campagne de Pologne de Septembre 1939.” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains. No. 192 (Decembre 
1998), 122. 
138
 Pierre Le Goyet. Le mystère Gamelin. (Paris : Presse de la Cité, 1975) 91. 
139
 A detailed account of the effects of French economic troubles on industrial production in the 1930s is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, it bears mentioning here that in his memoirs Gamelin blames France’s 
late start in re-armament for shortages in key areas (mines, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, aircraft of all types). 
See Servir I, 213. He claims that France should have begun to re-arm as of 1933 or 1934 at the latest, when the 
threat posed by Hitler’s rise to power first presented itself. 
54 
 
wrote General Bineau, chief of Gamelin’s Grand Quartier Général, “to make arrows out of any 
piece of wood.”140   
Gamelin waited for the coming battle at the head of a disparate and uneven army, 
excellent in some areas and woefully under-equipped in others.  This reality, coupled with the 
alarming news from Poland that a concentration of armor would in all likelihood be applied to 
specific spots along the French line of defence, incited Gamelin to gamble recklessly in the 
deployment of his army.  He knew he did not have enough troops or enough modern equipment 
to be strong everywhere.  General Ruby would later criticise Gamelin’s strategic deployment of 
the French army, stating that the “hinge” at Sedan, coupling the army’s northern mobile units 
with the static fortress divisions of the Maginot line, should have been solidified “de façon 
indiscutable”141. But for Gamelin, it was not possible to provide reinforcement for every sector 
sufficient to blunt the advance of a concentrated armored attack.  Therefore, he carefully 
considered where he expected the focus of the German effort, the Schwerpunkt, to be, and 
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7 - Waning Resolution 
 
We have seen the process whereby Gamelin reorganised the strategic deployment of the 
French army in response to the lessons learned in Poland.  By placing his reserves among the 
units already allocated for the forward defensive line in Belgium, he hoped to spare France the 
disastrous breakthroughs witnessed in the east.  But despite his re-deployment of the French 
northern armies, Gamelin remained deeply insecure about his ability to successfully resist a large 
scale German invasion conducted on the Polish model.  Throughout the eight month Phoney 
War, Gamelin experienced a growing sense of defeatism that found expression in a thinly 
disguised effort to distance himself from the outcome of the upcoming battle.  Any study of this 
process must begin with an analysis of his reconstitution of the French High Command. 
Until January 1940, the Grand Quartier Général was located at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 
under the joint command of Gamelin, as Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces and General 
Georges, as Commander of the Northeast Theatre of Operations.  On January 18
th
, there took 
place a fundamental reorganization of this command structure.  The G.Q.G. now reported solely 
to Gamelin and was located thirty kilometers from La Ferté in Montry.  General Georges, 
promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Front, would have his own HQ staff which 
would report to the G.Q.G.   
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Both HQs would have their own detachments of three of the four “bureaux”142.  Henri 
Gauché, chief of the Deuxième Bureau, described the inconveniences suffered by his staff as a 
result of the new command structure.  Each morning, an officer would be sent to make the thirty 
kilometer trip from La Ferté to Montry.  Late at night, the officer returned with important 
documents compiled by the branch at Montry.  Each of these needed to be studied and re-
approved by the Deuxième Bureau at La Ferté before it was distributed to its intended recipients.   
The loss of time and duplication of effort in each day’s work is striking in its obvious 
inefficiency.  Moreover, two hours were spent in travel time between the two branches of the 
bureau every time the Chiefs-of-Staff (General Gauché and Commander Baril) required a 
personal meeting, which took place frequently.
143
 
Gamelin’s explanation for the reorganization of the French command structure in 
December-January 1939-40 is rambling and unclear.  An entire chapter on the subject within his 
memoirs spans nearly forty pages and yet offers no direct statement of purpose in undertaking 
such an unprecedented restructuring. Allegedly, the move was in part designed to allow Gamelin 
the chance to personally take over the strategic command of France’s multiple “theatres of 
command.”  These included the Northeast Front, the Southeast Front, North Africa and the 
Levant.  In so doing, he claimed to be relieving Prime Minister Daladier from many of his more 
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burdensome tasks.  Other than this, Gamelin offers no direct comment on the advantages to be 
gained by such a shuffling of command structures.  He does, however, suggest an underlying 
justification in what he perceived as General George’s political untrustworthiness.  In this 
opinion, both Gamelin and Daladier were in perfect agreement.  In fact, Daladier was extremely 
sceptical about George’s military competence and political reliability.  “I wouldn’t wish to 
confide in him…since he belongs to the coterie, as you know.  He doesn’t possess your 
[Gamelin’s] serenity and independent spirit.  Also, I don’t have confidence in his military 
talents….[W]hat would you think about choosing General Billotte instead of Georges?”144  In 
matters of officer selection and promotion, Daladier wished to marginalize Georges as much as 
possible.  Gamelin writes, “[Daladier] wanted to see me maintain control over personnel to 
ensure that this responsibility would not fall into the hands of General Georges, whom he still 
suspected of belonging to a hostile political clan.”145   
Gamelin’s lengthy apology for the G.Q.G.’s reorganization presents very little concrete 
evidence of his true motivations.   Reading his explanation evokes the same confusion and 
exasperation expressed by French historian and Resistance leader, Marc Bloch:    
When a division of functions had been arranged between these last two - or, in 
ordinary human terms between General Georges and General Gamelin -  I was 
once present at a lecture staged by GHQ with the object of explaining the new 
organization.  The speaker made himself as clear as he knew how.  I was not, 
however, the only one there who entirely failed to get any clear cut idea of 
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It is difficult to find any approving voices among those who witnessed the reshuffling 
first-hand.  In General Georges’ opinion, the reorganization of the high command was a disaster.  
The effort would require the passing of at least two months, he believed, before normal 
operations could resume.  If a German attack took place during this time, “we would be exposed 
to the worst dangers.”147  Gamelin’s successor as Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces, Maxime 
Weygand, held a similar opinion.  “Such a clumsy organization would inevitably become, in 
time of war, the source of great difficulties and serious consequences.
148
 
The question then is why did Gamelin embark on a reorganization of the chain of 
command which baffled everyone, and which received the opprobrium of the vast majority of his 
most highly placed subordinates?  Was he alone able to glean benefits from this plan which has 
managed to elude every other observer (military or academic) over the last 70 years?  While 
Gamelin has been harshly criticised for his military/strategic thinking, it has nevertheless been 
the general consensus of historians that he was a competent bureaucrat, a capable administrator, 
if not an inspiring leader of men.  Martin Alexander defined his study of Gamelin as an endeavor 
“to focus attention...on Gamelin’s positive contribution to French national security and political-
military cooperation.”149   According to this study, Gamelin used his gifts as conciliator to 
“eradicate the confrontational atmosphere that [his predecessor] Weygand bequeathed... in 1935-
36.”150  Similarly, R.J. Young, while not as devoted to the rehabilitation of Gamelin’s reputation, 
nevertheless praises Gamelin’s talent for providing “a cheery word of compromise” in his 
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relations both civilian and military.
151
  Yet, even in this capacity of senior administrator in 
France’s military bureaucracy, one must conclude that Gamelin failed miserably in unilaterally 
reshuffling the country’s military command structure.  In truth, Gamelin was not trying to 
improve the efficiency of the French command system.  Rather, this was the start of a process of 
installing buffers between himself and the eventual conduct of the war.  It was another example 
of what he referred to as “a smokescreen in case things go badly.”152  “The move into Belgium, 





  Such a comment failed to take into account Gamelin’s central role in planning French 
strategy.  Jacques Minart, Gamelin’s own A.D.C. suspected “everything about the restructuring 
of the G.Q.G. had the effect of allowing the Commander-in-Chief to assign blame for any 
reverses to General Georges while allowing himself to take credit for any success.”154 Indeed, 
when the German armored divisions began pouring over the Meuse on May 12
th
, Gamelin 
pointed the finger to his beleaguered Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Front.  “Personally, I 
have no reserve forces,” he replied to Lieutenant Col. Lanquetot, who noticed with outrage the 
absence of strong reserve forces able to counter the German breakthrough at Sedan.  “All of our 
resources are in the hands of General Georges, who has full control over the Northeast Front.”155  
As Weygand observed with characteristic asperity, “While [Gamelin] was the one to conceive 
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the maneuver which led France to ruin, and who had ordered its execution, he nevertheless saw 
fit to announce that the resulting battle was, in fact, ‘General Georges’ battle’”156. 
Weygand had reason to cast doubt on the generalissimo’s accountability.   He knew 
Gamelin had already tried to resign his post twice.
157
  On both occasions (the most recent taking 
place on April 12
th
, less than a month before the German invasion), political allies convinced him 
to stay at his post, but the reasons for these efforts at dissuasion remain unclear.  Some
158
 have 
pointed to Gamelin’s fear that resignation would cause irreparable harm to the French army’s 
reputation.  Resignation by the army’s Commander-in-Chief would indeed have attracted 
negative commentary at a time when morale needed to be maintained at the highest possible 
level.  However, the fact that this was not the first time Gamelin had attempted to relinquish his 
command, coupled with the transparent transfer of responsibility onto the shoulders of his second 
in command, casts real doubt on Gamelin’s desire to continue in his role as military chief.   
Moreover, General Doumenc, Chief of Staff of the Grand Quartier Général, wrote on March 13
th
 
about a meeting with Gamelin during which the generalissimo was unusually candid about his 
personal impressions. 
 [Gamelin] told me, ‘I’m handing in my resignation.  I’ll be leaving early to 
 write it down.’  A little later, alone with me, he added: ‘It’s my duty!  My 
 resignation will be a relief to France.  It is a service that I will provide for 
 the country.  After all, I’m leaving behind a magnificent army in excellent  
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This exchange highlights a crucial element in understanding the enigmatic Gamelin; that 
behind the imperturbable exterior, Gamelin was a man of undulating emotional extremes which 
were manifested in alternating periods of extreme confidence and abject despair.
160
  This 
tendency was displayed by the transformation of Gamelin’s self-pitying attempts to resign in 
March/April into the supreme confidence he seemed to enjoy only a few weeks later on the day 
of the German attack.  The morning of May 10
th
 saw Gamelin in the brightest spirits, certain that 
he had guessed correctly and that the Germans were, in fact, engaged in a repetition of the 1914 
Schlieffen Plan through Belgium.  “If you had seen,” wrote Paul Reynaud, the Third Republic’s 
last Prime Minister, “as I have done this morning, the broad smile of General Gamelin when he 
told me the direction of the enemy attack, you would feel no uneasiness.”161  This optimism did 
not last.  Only two days later German armor began to cross the Meuse and Gamelin collapsed 
again into sullen inactivity.  The following section will attempt to build the case showing how 
Gamelin’s own words and actions, subsequent to the German attack on May 10th, are those of a 
leader who is already convinced he is beaten, and who has, to all intents and purposes, given up 
the fight.  
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8 – Despair 
 
“You want to know how I imagine war in the near future?”  Gamelin asked the novelist 




  “Well I think that a period of apparent immobility 
will be followed abruptly by an action into which every resource will be flung all at once...and in 
which the decision will come much more rapidly than people think....Yes, it will be very rapid -  
and terrible.”  These words are particularly striking considering that Gamelin foresaw French 
victory being possible only after a long period spent accumulating Allied resources for an 
eventual offensive into German territory in 1941 or 1942.
163
  In confessing to Romains that he 
imagined the outcome of the war to be rapid and terrible, Gamelin betrayed the extent of his 
growing pessimism concerning France’s likelihood of winning a war with Germany. 
This pessimism would have been fuelled in part, no doubt, by a number of French 
military exercises conducted prior to the war.  These clearly demonstrated the awesome 
penetrative power of modern armored formations.  The first such exercise took place in the 
spring of 1938 in the area around Sédan under General Prételat.  The second occurred the 
following year around Nancy, led by General Réquin.  In both cases the scenario in question was 
whether divisions of massed armor, advancing through the Ardennes toward the center of the 
French line, would have a chance at creating a breakthrough.  In both exercises, the result was 
total French defeat.  Gamelin makes mention of these wargames in his memoirs and would 
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certainly have called them to mind in the days following May 12-13 as the Panzers succeeded in 
crossing the Meuse.
164
  How then could France’s leading soldier have failed to draw the 
important lesson from these early military exercises?  In fact, before the Polish campaign 
Gamelin did not doubt the striking power of armored units, nor did he believe the Ardennes 
sector invulnerable to massive breakthrough operations.  Rather, Gamelin’s reaction to the war 
games of 1938 and 1939 was consistent with his long-standing conviction that armor by itself 
was incapable of exploiting such a breakthrough.  That is, while he believed German 
Panzerdivisionen had the strength to create a breach somewhere in his line, Gamelin also 
considered a lengthy accumulation of infantry and artillery, along the lines of the methodical 
battle, necessary to transform the rupture into a decisive breakthrough.  At this stage, before the 
war, he conceived of armored divisions as a kind of anti-siege weapon, a powerful force for 
counter-attack, especially in the opening phase of hostilities.
165
  Therefore, he believed that even 
if the events depicted in the war games conducted by Prételat and Réquin were to come true, he 
would have time to rush re-enforcements to the area in time to prevent a collapse.  Gamelin’s 
great surprise from the Polish campaign was not the impact of German tanks in action, but rather 
the manner in which they threw themselves headlong into the breaches they had created, acting 
independently to exploit local breakthroughs.   
Following the events in Poland, Gamelin believed he had provided sufficient counter-
measures to this eventuality by the creation of three D.C.R.s (Division Cuirassée de Réserve), 
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with a fourth nearing completion by the time of the German invasion.  Their poor performance
166
 
and virtual annihilation restored France to the same scenario depicted in the war games of 1938 
and 1939, without any remaining forces to stem the advance of German armor.   
After May 12
th
, Gamelin’s waning resolution collapsed into manifest defeatism.  
Although his lengthy memoirs aim to prove his unwavering service to the French republic, his 
readers are met with inconsistencies at every turn, which suggest the extent of the 
generalissimo’s confusion and lack of direction during the last few painful days of his command.  
“I admit,” Gamelin wrote after the war, “that I wasn’t able to find the time to visit our northern 
front throughout the entire month of April.”  This conspicuous absence from the day to day 
activities of his army persisted into May, even after the German invasion had begun. He did 
address his troops on May 12
th
 at ten in the morning, but from that day to the 17
th
, he was silent.  
He claims to have been preoccupied, at this crucial stage of the war, with events in Holland.
167
  
This is curious in the light of his description of the Breda Variant as an “hors d’oeuvre” which 
could in no way impact the general course of the battle.  Why then did he devote his full 
attention to this appetizer instead of to the main course unravelling opposite the Ardennes?  And 
if his attention was fully on matters taking place in Holland, why did he choose to absent himself 
from the only meeting called by the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina, before Holland’s surrender?  This 








 D.C.R.s were largely irrelevant to the conduct of the battle.  The 3rd was wasted by 
General Flavigny on May 14
th
, when he chose to spread his tanks in groups of three to bottleneck local crossroads 
instead of massing them for an attack.  Few saw actual combat and were largely bypassed by the German armor 
swinging west toward the Channel coast.  The 2
nd
 D.C.R. was caught by surprise while unloading its tanks from 
railway transports.  It too was bypassed and played no important role in the battle.  The 1st entered into battle with 
its fuel trucks at the rear of the enormous column, with predictable results.  The Fourth D.C.R. activated on May 11
th
 




 with two attacks in the area 
around Montcornet.  These attacks, however, quickly ran out of steam due to a lack of aircraft support.   Karl-Heinz 
Frieser’s account of these actions are an excellent reference.  See Frieser, 198-205, 264-65.    
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was an inter-allied meeting of the Comité de Guerre called by the Queen on May 15
th168
.  No 
explanation for his absence is provided in Gamelin’s memoirs, and it casts doubt on the 
General’s claim to have been (overly) fixated on events in the Dutch lowlands.   
Gamelin’s record of involvement between May 12th and 17th is remarkably thin, in both 
tactical and strategic aspects of the battle.  Such action consisted of limited requests for more 
British air support and minor directives to the air force and navy
169
.  In any event, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French land forces essentially withdrew from sight once the Meuse 





 1940, Gamelin sent Georges one hundred and forty general communications.  Over 
the next nine days he sent none, despite his reservations about how Georges was handling the 
battle
170
.  One observer watched him during this period, “serene in appearance, but giving way 
steadily to a creeping, deafening fear, isolating himself increasingly”171.  On the 15th he 
contacted Daladier by phone to explain that he had no troops between Laon and Paris with which 
to contain the German breakthrough.  Daladier cried out, “What I just heard would mean the end 
of the French army!”  Gamelin replied curtly, “It is the end of the French army.”172  As one 
observer remarked, by the 16
th
 he “wandered sad and detached, inspiring a profound pity, acting 
as though the battle was already lost.”173 
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It was on this day when he, alongside Reynaud and Daladier, met with Winston Churchill 
at the Quai D’Orsay.  Gamelin showed his guests a small map on which the breakthrough in the 
allied lines around Sedan was indicated in red ink.  When Churchill inquired about the inevitable 
counterattack against the German “bulge”, Gamelin’s only response was, “inferiority of 
numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of method” – and then a helpless shrug of his 
shoulders.
174
  In this response we see the extent to which the Commander-in-Chief, bankrupt of 
any ideas to stem the tide of German armor, had resigned himself to defeat. 
On the 17
th 
, Gamelin composed his desperate eleventh hour order of the day.  This 
document is curious for its near verbatim repetition of a passage from Instruction sur l’Emploi 
Tactique des Grandes Unités.  This manual claims that in the event of armored breakthrough by 
enemy forces, bypassed soldiers were expected to hold their positions, “to stand and die rather 
than retreat....[E]ach defender must resist to the end and be killed rather than back away”175  
Gamelin deemed it “necessary to intervene due to various reports of indiscipline which had 
reached me from a collection of sources”.176  His message to the troops, issued at the height of 
the military crisis, demonstrates the extent of his detachment from the battle.  Rather than 
drawing on any shared sense of patriotism, or anything at all which may have stirred the army on 
to greater efforts, Gamelin’s words were instead inspired by the Ministry of Defence’s 
operational manual.  Most French officers would thus have recognised this source when Gamelin 
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wrote, “any soldier who cannot advance must be killed on the spot rather than giving up the 
ground given to him to defend.”177  
Two days later (May 19
th
), Gamelin sat down to compose an update/explanation on the 
rapidly deteriorating military situation, addressed to Daladier as Minister of National Defence.  
As the battle raged, with the French armies in desperate need of focused leadership, Gamelin sat 
alone to write an enormous letter (complete with two annexes) on the battle as though it were 
already a historical event.  In it, he laid blame on the morale of the soldiers, on communism in 
the ranks and on the nation’s lack of preparation and commitment to war.178  On the same day, 
Gamelin’s liaison officer suggested replacing General Georges with General Huntziger, whose 
2
nd
 army had recovered well from its initial mauling, and was succeeding in preventing any 
widening of the breach around Sedan.  Gamelin listened to the suggestion silently, then raised up 
his hands in a gesture signifying, “what difference would it make?”179 
By the 19
th, Gamelin’s self-imposed removal from the conduct of the battle had so 
alarmed his subordinates that a number of them were spurred into action.  General Doumenc, 
chief of the G.Q.G. in Montry was convinced that Gamelin should “faire acte de commande”180.  
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Doumenc telephoned the generalissimo and sent General Koeltz to pick him up by car.  It was 
only after this effort by his subordinates to involve him directly in the battle that Gamelin sat 
down to write his Instruction Secrète et Personelle no.12.  This was to be his final written 
command. 
Much has been written about Instruction no. 12, but what is essentially important about 
this hastily written note, is that it had no basis in reality.  While its content was theoretically 
sound, consisting of a plan to pinch off the German armored spearhead with simultaneous British 
and French attacks from both north and south, the resources for such an attack were clearly 
unavailable.  Nowhere was the necessary equipment assembled and available.  As Gamelin 
finished the Instruction with the words, “everything depends on the next few hours,” it is unclear 
whether the General believed the instruction could actually have been acted upon.  Certainly the 
situation maps on General George’s walls, updated hourly, would have informed him that no 
such attack could be mounted according to the timescale he proposed.  In any event, this letter 
was an anomaly in that it was the only Instruction Personelle et Secrète to be prepared by his 
own hand.  The usual procedure was to have his personal staff prepare the directive and submit it 
to the G.Q.G.
181
   
When he had finished this “acte de commande” requested by his subordinates, Gamelin 
placed the folded paper on a table near Georges.  “I’m going back to Vincennes,” he said, “you 
will read this after my departure.”182  This request constituted an inexplicable waste of time and 
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casts further doubt on Gamelin’s sincerity in drafting Instruction no. 12.  At that critical moment 




Martin Alexander has defended Gamelin’s aloofness during the battle, arguing that he 
wisely resisted “temptations to interfere and override his subordinate generals…for the first nine 
days of the battle for France.”184  Alexander states that any such interference “would have been 
akin to Hitler’s incorrigible meddling in the minutiae of the eastern front battles of 1941-45.” But 
as General Doumenc wrote in his diary, “Such a notion [that a Commander-in-Chief should 
avoid involving himself in the conduct of the battle] is entirely foreign to the accepted practice in 
our army.”185  Doumenc argues that French Commanders-in-Chief have always seen fit to take 
personal command at the key place of battle.  “And the subordinates thus visited never dreamt of 
feeling themselves ruffled or humiliated” at the encroachment. Similarly, historians Eliot A. 
Cohen and John Gooch have observed, “Gamelin’s inertia deprived his subordinates of the 
guidance they needed – a guidance that...the interwar regulations led them to expect.”186  
Gamelin’s absence from George’s H.Q. in the crucial first days of the battle was therefore a 
personal decision which ran counter to established French military tradition. 
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The record of Gamelin’s conduct after May 12th clearly points to a leader who no longer 
seriously considered victory as a possible outcome to the battle at hand.  Vincennes H.Q. was 




  After that 
point we see from Gamelin’s own words and actions that his doubts and waning resolution on 
display since the end of the Polish campaign had turned into overt defeatism.  Events in Poland 
had led Gamelin to accept a wildly risky gamble in sacrificing his reserves for a stronger front 
line.  When this strategy failed, he ceased to act as Commander-in-Chief and marginalised 
himself, waiting impotently for what he saw as unavoidable defeat.  
 
 9 – Concluding Thoughts on Gamelin  
 
A closer look at Gamelin’s long service to the French army shows which attributes 
allowed him to reach such high rank and distinction.  In his youth, he was singularly talented at 
quickly assessing a rapidly changing military situation and responding with a well-conceived 
solution from which he would not waver.  Gamelin’s steady rise through the ranks came in no 
small measure from the extraordinary impression this ability made upon his superiors.  From St. 
Cyr to leading the French military mission in Brazil, to suppressing rebellion in the Levant, 
Gamelin never failed in demonstrating a subtle, adaptable intellect, high energy and quick, 
accurate appraisals of fluid military situations.   
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Assessments of Gamelin’s soldierly talents between the 1890s and 1920s follow a distinct 
pattern.  They serve to illuminate those attributes which served him in earning the approbation of 
his superiors.  In 1899 General Lanrezac wrote of the then 27 year old Gamelin, “superior 
intelligence – quick and accurate judgment…ardent, upright, firm and decisive character.”188  In 
1911, Joffre lamented the loss to his staff when Gamelin was given command of the 14
th
 
battalion of “chasseurs” in Grenoble: “[Gamelin] is noteworthy for his high culture, his judgment 
and his understanding of the most intricate military questions.”189  Joffre also made mention of 
Gamelin’s “breadth of intelligence, the firmness and certainty of his convictions, the quickness 
and maturity of his conceptions.”190   This ability to form rapid assessments of military problems 
coupled with the decisiveness to act upon them promptly, characterised Gamelin’s style of 
command. “If this is philosophy,” Time Magazine published in a cover story on Gamelin in 
August 1939, “it is time all generals were philosophers.”191 
Since 1940 however, this intellectual prowess, so appreciated before the war, has been re-
assessed and redefined in terms of an over-reflective tendency to see all sides of an argument and 
to act upon none.  Defeat recast the pre-war image of Gamelin’s contemplative acuity into one of 
bookish incompetence.  Following the battle, Pertinax was quick to criticise the disgraced 
generalissimo as a serene and self-satisfied “military Buddha”.192  “It has become fashionable to 
accuse me of being a philosopher,” wrote Gamelin in 1946.193   Indeed, de Gaulle’s portrayal of 
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Gamelin as a secluded scholar has, over the last seven decades, eclipsed his pre-war reputation as 
an intellectually gifted soldier and cunning strategist.    
However, neither depiction of Gamelin is correct or complete.  His talent for quick 
assessment of a military situation, which had been so appreciated by Joffre, was the same 
mechanism which convinced Gamelin of the desperate situation faced by France in the lead-up to 
war.  It was this firmness and certainty of his convictions
194
 which prompted him to embark on 
an extraordinarily risky forward defence into Belgium, and to effectively abandon the struggle 
once this great gamble had proven to be a calamitous mistake.  Having thrown the dice and lost, 




.   
Historians have thus been faced with puzzling contradictions in their efforts to understand 
Gamelin’s role in the Battle of France, resulting in decades of references to Gamelin’s enigmatic 
nature.
195
  In this vein, Thierry Sarmant wrote, “As for General Gamelin, silent and mysterious in 
all this affair, his feelings on the Polish campaign are not known.”196  The present work has 
endeavored to clarify this mystery alluded to by Sarmant and to demonstrate how Gamelin’s 
“feelings” on the Polish campaign significantly contributed to the collapse of the French army in 
May 1940.   
If historians have grappled with Gamelin’s secretive persona over the years, it must be 
noted that they have been given less help than may have been hoped for by his own extensive 
writings.  An elusive and selective rendition of facts and events characterise the writing style of 
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Gamelin’s three-volume memoirs.  In his enormous work, eighty pages are devoted to the 
Norwegian campaign, while only 60 are allotted to the Battle of France itself.  When the author 
finally makes his way to the events of May 10
th
, 1940, after 1400 pages of text, he takes obvious 
strides to avoid the painful realities of his subject matter.  In relating Prime Minister Reynaud’s 
attempts to dismiss him just prior to the German invasion, Gamelin meanders through his 
memories of General Guillaumat, whose service in the First World War brought him into contact 
with a much younger Gamelin.  “He always showed me great affection…he hugged me and said, 
‘All those who know your achievements hope that you stay in command of the French armies, 
especially if there is to be a storm.’”197   This model of personal justification permeates 
Gamelin’s memoirs.  As a result, these texts have a tendency to gloss over information crucial to 
our understanding of May 1940, and elaborate instead on minutiae which serve to defend the ex-
generalissimo’s reputation.   
A tendency to manipulate the narrative of his service to France obfuscates the real 
concepts and impressions which animated him during the crucial months of the Phoney War.  
Only through an analysis of his actions can we inform ourselves reliably on the true currents of 
his thoughts.  And from late September to the eve of the German attack in the west, it was the 
Polish campaign which dominated his thoughts, dictated his strategy and prompted him to adapt 
radical solutions in an attempt to deal with what he increasingly saw as a desperate military 
situation. 
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The mystery of Gamelin is not really so mysterious when one considers that many of his 
most controversial decisions were taken in response to the Polish campaign.  Historians have 
been too quick to dismiss his lack of strategic reserve with curt statements of incompetence.  
Often he has been criticized for failing to understand the nature of warfare as it existed in the late 
1930s. Neither of these statements is true; they could not be true of a leader who had risen so 
high, so quickly and who had impressed his colleagues for so many years with the breadth of his 
knowledge and intellect.  His fatal incorporation of France’s strategic reserve into the front line 
was based on a rational appraisal of the experiences of the Polish army in the first few days of 
September, 1939.  It grew out of faulty intelligence which had long convinced the French high 
command that German re-armament had reached an unrealistic level of development.  Gamelin’s 
aggressive forward defense was intended to counter the operational paralysis which the Luftwaffe 
had imposed upon the Polish army and its high command.  It was an enormous gamble, a 
spectacular failure, but not the oversight that Winston Churchill had suspected.  Having wagered 
France’s fate on an attempt to saturate a limited battlefield in Belgium and grind the German 
armies to a halt, Gamelin had no answer for the breakthrough in the center of his line, opposite 
the Ardennes.  Only then did his pessimism regarding France’s potential to defend itself 
successfully give way to obvious despair and defeatism.  After May 12
th
, his own words and 
actions point to a defeated leader, all too aware that he had staked his entire legacy on a losing 
hand.  The Battle of France did not follow the now-familiar script of an aggressive Germany 
striking decisively against a hesitant and anachronistic French high command.  Rather, it was 
Gamelin’s own enormously aggressive strategy, informed by the most modern tactics used 
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